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Mandarin","micro_label":"Photo","micro_label_kind":"gallery","network_label":"RFA","network_logo_url":"/static/uploads/direct_network_logos/rfa_ca00144ac549.png","published_at":"2026-09-02T18:13:07","published_at_display":"2 Sep 2026, 18:13 GMT","sequence_badge_label":null,"sequence_count":null,"sequence_count_label":null,"sequence_frames":[],"sequence_kind":null,"source_name":"rfa_english_rss","source_name_label":"RFA English RSS","source_type":"rss","summary":"Read a version of this story in Mandarin One of Hong Kong\u2019s most prominent pro-democracy activists, Joshua Wong, will likely have to serve consecutive sentences after pleading guilty to foreign collusion Wednesday, a Hong Kong-based legal professional told Radio Free Asia. Wong, 29, is one of the most internationally recognizable faces of the now-quashed democracy movement in the city. He was among 45 Hong Kong opposition politicians and pro-democracy activists who were convicted with \u201cconspiracy to commit subversion\u201d under the city\u2019s 2020 National Security Law for taking part in a democratic primary in the summer of 2020. He is already serving a four-year-and-eight-month sentence for subversion. He is currently due for release in January, but will almost certainly have to serve more time after entering his plea. A March 4, 2021, photo shows pro-democracy activist Joshua Wong walking to a prison van to head to court in Hong Kong. (Tyrone Siu/Reuters) Wong is accused of trying to call on foreign countries, organizations or people in 2020 to \u201cimpose sanctions or blockade, or engage in other hostile activities\u201d against China and Hong Kong over the controversial law. The foreign collusion charge has a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, but Wong\u2019s lawyer, Derek Chan, asked Judge Tam Yiu-ho to give Wong a sentence of three to 10 years, which is at the \u201cupper end of the lower band\u201d of punishments for the crime, according to a report by AFP. Chan noted that Wong had already served most of his first sentence and that his actions in the second crime were not particularly severe. Low possibility of parole Regardless of what sentence Wong will receive, he will likely have to serve it in its entirety after his current sentence is up, a Hong Kong legal professional identified only by his surname Wang, told RFA Mandarin. \u201cUnder the principles of common law in Hong Kong, when two cases involve different offenses, the court will consider the criminal acts, the time of occurrence, and the relationship between the two cases before deciding whether the sentences will be served concurrently or consecutively,\u201d said Wang. \u201cJudges will also adjust the sentence according to the totality principle to ensure that the total sentence is proportionate to the overall culpability.\u201d Wang said the key to determining how long Wong would serve would be whether the court considers him to be a \u201cprincipal offender, or one whose offences were of a grave nature,\u201d an \u201cactive participant\u201d in the crime, or an \u201cother participant.\u201d Wong could also receive a one-third reduction of his sentence for pleading guilty. The likelihood that Wong would receive parole is very low, Wang said, so he would probably have to serve the full sentence. Judge Tam said that the sentence would be decided \u201cas soon as possible\u201d but did not offer a specific date, AFP reported. Deprived of freedom According to reports, Joshua Wong has been continuously detained since November 23, 2020, after pleading guilty to the June 21, 2019, siege of the Hong Kong Police Headquarters. He was subsequently implicated in cases involving unauthorized assembly, including a rally to commemorate the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre, and his involvement in the pro-democracy primary. He has now been deprived of his freedom for more than 2,100 days. The prosecution alleges that Joshua Wong and another prominent pro-democracy figure, Nathan Law, had been conspiring together since 2016. Police officers stand guard outside the High Court in Hong Kong, Sept. 2, 2026. (Chan Long Hei/AP) The two lobbied internationally to promote the \u201cdemocratic self-determination\u201d proposition, traveling to the United States, Germany, and Italy to meet with local political figures, including then-U.S. House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi and then-U.S. Senator Marco Rubio, and participating in the promotion of the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act. Wong also spearheaded four joint petitions demanding that the United States, France, and Switzerland cease supplying weapons or strategic equipment to the Hong Kong police. Law left Hong Kong after the national security law went into effect in 2020, but Wong vowed to stay. More than 30 people had lined up overnight outside the court to obtain tickets to attend the hearing, with police officers on standby. One of the citizens in line, identified by her surname Liao, told the media that she wanted to offer moral support to Joshua Wong, because she believes he should not be treated this way. Hong Kong pro-democracy activist Joshua Wong speaks to the media after being arrested and released on bail on August 30, 2019 in Hong Kong. (Chris McGrath/Getty Images) (Chris McGrath/Getty Images) In this photo provided by Demosisto, Joshua Wong, secretary general of the political party Demosisto, is taken away by traffic police during an attempt to intercept the motorcade of top Chinese official Zhang Dejiang on May 19, 2016 in Hong Kong. (Getty Images) (Getty Images) As photos of Hong Kong democracy activists (clockwise from top) Jimmy Lai, Joshua Wong and Benny Tai are on display in the background, U.S. Speaker of the House Rep. Nancy Pelosi testifies during a hearing before The Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) at Dirksen Senate Office Building on Capitol Hill on February 3, 2022 in Washington. (Alex Wong/Getty Images) (Alex Wong/Getty Images) Joshua Wong, center, campaigns with his replacement candidate Kelvin Lam on November 23, 2019 in Hong Kong. (Chris McGrath/Getty Images) (Chris McGrath/Getty Images) Pro-democracy activist Joshua Wong attends a press conference after being disqualified for his Legislative Council nominations on July 31, 2020 in Hong Kong. (Anthony Kwan/Getty Images) (Anthony Kwan/Getty Images) Hong Kong protest leader Joshua Wong, 22, speaks as thousands of protesters surround the police headquarter in Hong Kong on June 21, 2019. (Paula Bronstein/Getty Images ) (Paula Bronstein/Getty Images) Student leader and pro-democracy activist Joshua Wong speaks to media on a road outside the Hong Kong Government complex on November 17, 2014 in Hong Kong. (Chris McGrath/Getty Images) (Chris McGrath/Getty Images) Pro-democracy activist Joshua Wong speaks during a press conference after being disqualified for his Legislative Council nominations on July 31, 2020 in Hong Kong. (Anthony Kwan/Getty Images) (Anthony Kwan/Getty Images) Hong Kong pro-democracy activists Agnes Chow, left, and Joshua Wong speak to the media after being arrested and released on bail on August 30, 2019 in Hong Kong. (Chris McGrath/Getty Images) (Chris McGrath/Getty Images) Pro-democracy activist Joshua Wong speaks to the media and supporters outside the Legislative Council shortly after being released from prison on June 17, 2019 in Hong Kong. (Carl Court/Getty Images) (Carl Court/Getty Images) Pro-democracy activist Joshua Wong prepares to board a Correctional Service Department van at Lai Chi Kok ahead of a court hearing at Lai Chi Kok Reception Centre on December 18, 2020 in Hong Kong. (Anthony Kwan/Getty Images) (Anthony Kwan/Getty Images) Joshua Wong is being punished for exercising his right to free speech, Frances Hui, an exiled Hong Kong pro-democracy advocate and policy and advocacy manager for the Washington-based Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation, said in a video the organization released prior to the trial. Hui reflected on knowing Wong since 2016, when they were both teenagers. \u201cFor those of us who watched him grow up, it\u2019s hard to think about the teenager we knew, and it should be hard for anyone to accept that he could now spend decades more behind bars,\u201d Hui said in the video. \u201cJoshua is about to turn 30 this year. He should be thinking about his future, not whether he\u2019ll ever be free again.\u201d Edited by Eugene Whong","title":"Imprisoned Hong Kong activist Joshua Wong pleads guilty to \u2018foreign collusion\u2019","topic":"China","translation_language":"","url":"https://rfa.org/english/china/2026/09/02/joshua-wong-guilty-plea-hong-kong-national-security-law/","video_url":null},{"article_body_paragraphs":[],"audio_source_url":null,"author":"RFA Tibetan","available_dubs":[],"downloadable_assets":["https://d3ayjbmlrrjm3o.cloudfront.net/wp-radiofreeasia/RFA_Video/20260901/6a9757ca6b980f65e1b7e8b4/t_89e8a26710db41988b8f7f7c4fd9d6b7_name_nepal_tibet_mudslide_1/file_540x960-1600-v4.mp4","https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/FQ45CZCEIBCJTAV3JKMBJUFHKE.JPG?auth=36d2b6ada6dd08790b81c15efaddba4fd6a8609e549bd9a68eb1e51ffca0db7e&smart=true&width=1500"],"duration_display":"0:00","duration_seconds":null,"embed_url":null,"id":12634,"image_caption":"Rescue workers operate excavators and loaders to repair a damaged road leading to Kyirong Port following a mudslide, in Shigatse, Tibet, Aug. 29, 2026.","image_url":"https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/FQ45CZCEIBCJTAV3JKMBJUFHKE.JPG?auth=36d2b6ada6dd08790b81c15efaddba4fd6a8609e549bd9a68eb1e51ffca0db7e&smart=true&width=1500","is_clip":true,"item_type":"video","item_type_label":"Video","language_label":"English","media_credit":"RFA Tibetan","micro_label":"Video report","micro_label_kind":"video","network_label":"RFA","network_logo_url":"/static/uploads/direct_network_logos/rfa_ca00144ac549.png","published_at":"2026-09-01T23:16:15","published_at_display":"1 Sep 2026, 23:16 GMT","sequence_badge_label":null,"sequence_count":null,"sequence_count_label":null,"sequence_frames":[],"sequence_kind":null,"source_name":"rfa_english_rss","source_name_label":"RFA English RSS","source_type":"rss","summary":"Among the thousands of missing people are 10 Tibetan tour guides, who worked near the border.","title":"Sources in Tibet and Nepal reveal stories of flood destruction, survival","topic":"Tibet","translation_language":"","url":"https://rfa.org/english/tibet/2026/09/01/tibet-flood-nepal-tour-guides/","video_url":"https://d3ayjbmlrrjm3o.cloudfront.net/wp-radiofreeasia/RFA_Video/20260901/6a9757ca6b980f65e1b7e8b4/t_89e8a26710db41988b8f7f7c4fd9d6b7_name_nepal_tibet_mudslide_1/file_540x960-1600-v4.mp4"},{"article_body_paragraphs":[],"audio_source_url":null,"author":"RFA Tibetan","available_dubs":[],"downloadable_assets":["https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/FQ45CZCEIBCJTAV3JKMBJUFHKE.JPG?auth=36d2b6ada6dd08790b81c15efaddba4fd6a8609e549bd9a68eb1e51ffca0db7e&smart=true&width=1500"],"duration_display":"0:00","duration_seconds":null,"embed_url":null,"id":12633,"image_caption":"Rescue workers operate excavators and loaders to repair a damaged road leading to Kyirong Port following a mudslide, in Shigatse, Tibet, Aug. 29, 2026.","image_url":"https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/FQ45CZCEIBCJTAV3JKMBJUFHKE.JPG?auth=36d2b6ada6dd08790b81c15efaddba4fd6a8609e549bd9a68eb1e51ffca0db7e&smart=true&width=1500","is_clip":false,"item_type":"article","item_type_label":"Article","language_label":"English","media_credit":"RFA Tibetan","micro_label":"Photo","micro_label_kind":"gallery","network_label":"RFA","network_logo_url":"/static/uploads/direct_network_logos/rfa_ca00144ac549.png","published_at":"2026-09-01T23:16:15","published_at_display":"1 Sep 2026, 23:16 GMT","sequence_badge_label":null,"sequence_count":null,"sequence_count_label":null,"sequence_frames":[],"sequence_kind":null,"source_name":"rfa_english_rss","source_name_label":"RFA English RSS","source_type":"rss","summary":"As the death toll from last week\u2019s glacial flooding disaster at the Tibet-Nepal border surpassed 1,000 on Tuesday, sources inside Tibet told Radio Free Asia that a group of 10 Tibetan travel guides are among the missing. AFP reported that more than 4,500 people were missing, but both the death toll and the number of missing could be higher, as exiled Tibetans and advocacy groups have accused China of underreporting casualty totals on the Tibetan side of the border. Chinese authorities have forbidden journalists from entering the disaster zone or interviewing affected family members, and have punished those accused of \u201cspreading rumors\u201d about the disaster, New York-based Human Rights Watch reported. Residents and officials of Kyirong County (Gyirong in Chinese), which borders Nepal\u2019s Rasuwa district, witnessed entire villages destroyed, they told RFA Tibetan on condition of anonymity for security reasons. \u201cWithin 3 minutes the flood reached the area near the Kyirong customs office, and no one who was there survived,\u201d a Tibetan resident of Kyirong County told RFA. \u201cThere were about 30 people in the village.\u201d The resident said that many people from the area had been working in the area on road construction at the time of the disaster. \u201cNow, many of them are dead,\u201d the resident said. \u201cThere is no hope left. It was like a dream. It came out of nowhere.\u201d A Chinese official in the same area confirmed that several people who were displaced by the disaster were able to find alternative lodging. \u201cA few people from the affected area have been kept in a guesthouse and in paying guest rooms in private homes,\u201d the official told RFA. \u201cI am not comfortable explaining other details.\u201d Missing guides Ten Tibetan travel guides from the Tibetan capital Lhasa, the surrounding areas, and elsewhere have been missing since the flood, another Tibetan resident told RFA. The source said that the guides were stationed in the Dram (Zhangmu) area along the border. \u201cThey usually take travellers and tourists from the Nepal-Tibet border and take them on excursions and pilgrimage to places like Mount Kailash and Lake Manasarovar,\u201d the second resident said. Two people from the village of Resuo survived the disaster according to a third Tibetan resident, also from Kyirong. An aerial view shows a torrent of muddy water surging past houses and through the Trishuli River in the aftermath of flash floods at Trishuli Center in Nepal's Nuwakot district on Sept. 1, 2026. (Arun Sankar/AFP) \u201cTwo people were able to run toward the mountain,\u201d the third resident said. \u201cOnly if you can run toward a hilltop can you save yourself; otherwise it is very difficult to survive. The force of the water was so strong.\u201d According to the third resident, Kyirong county was largely spared because it is a bit farther from the affected area. \u201cBut the water flowed about three kilometers upstream,\u201d the third resident said. \u201cAbout 15 families from the village had their homes completely destroyed\u201d The third resident said that many of the people who work there are in the military or are customs officials that work on the border. \u201cWe \u2026 are also not allowed to visit the affected area,\u201d the third resident said. \u201cAll we can do is console the family members.\u201d Stories of survival On the Nepal side of the border several residents told RFA, on condition of anonymity to speak freely, that they witnessed the disaster as it happened. \u201cThe flood came like a fall from the sky and felt like an earthquake,\u201d a resident of Serthang, a subdistrict of the town of Timure in the affected area on the Nepal side, told RFA. \u201cI saw the flood coming down and entering my home at the same time.\u201d The Serthang resident said that several villagers were at the family home to celebrate the birth of a son. \u201cThankfully, we were all able to run and escape,\u201d the Serthang resident said. \u201cBut there were many older people and children who could not escape because they lacked physical strength.\u201d Nepali army soldiers move a survivor following flash floods and a mudslide near the Nepal-Tibet border in Nepal, Aug. 27, 2026. (Nepali Army/Reuters) A second Serthang resident told RFA that he saw his elderly mother washed away in the flood. \u201cBefore the flood, my wife and I were with my 98-year-old mother,\u201d the second Serthang resident said. \u201cI had to leave my mother behind and saw her swept away by the water in front of my eyes. My wife barely escaped the floodwater.\u201d The second Serthang resident said that within two minutes the village was lost to the carnage. \u201cThe electricity had gone out sometime before the flood came,\u201d the second Serthang resident said. \u201cThen suddenly, the whole village was filled with people shouting. In two minutes, the whole village was flooded. I was so scared that I had to run barefoot.\u201d A flood of this magnitude was unprecedented for the area, the second Serthang resident said. \u201cThe height of the flood was as high as a tall building,\u201d the second Serthang resident said. \u201cIt seemed like the water was in the sky. In the meantime, the house was no longer visible.\u201d Edited by Eugene Whong","title":"Sources in Tibet and Nepal reveal stories of flood destruction, survival","topic":"Tibet","translation_language":"","url":"https://rfa.org/english/tibet/2026/09/01/tibet-flood-nepal-tour-guides/","video_url":null},{"article_body_paragraphs":[],"audio_source_url":null,"author":"Eugene Whong for RFA","available_dubs":[],"downloadable_assets":["https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/VE2RFXLZDNAWFODSY2PBPG6454.jpg?auth=215f38ab7f54b4a3f348d5ee1c8508dd75d7289d55e7ab8e2d56107976cc6d54&smart=true&width=1500"],"duration_display":"0:00","duration_seconds":null,"embed_url":null,"id":12538,"image_caption":"Artists perform at the opening of the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting in Koror, Palau, Aug. 31, 2026.","image_url":"https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/VE2RFXLZDNAWFODSY2PBPG6454.jpg?auth=215f38ab7f54b4a3f348d5ee1c8508dd75d7289d55e7ab8e2d56107976cc6d54&smart=true&width=1500","is_clip":false,"item_type":"article","item_type_label":"Article","language_label":"English","media_credit":"Eugene Whong for RFA","micro_label":"Photo","micro_label_kind":"gallery","network_label":"RFA","network_logo_url":"/static/uploads/direct_network_logos/rfa_ca00144ac549.png","published_at":"2026-09-01T20:38:36","published_at_display":"1 Sep 2026, 20:38 GMT","sequence_badge_label":null,"sequence_count":null,"sequence_count_label":null,"sequence_frames":[],"sequence_kind":null,"source_name":"rfa_english_rss","source_name_label":"RFA English RSS","source_type":"rss","summary":"The 2026 Pacific Islands Forum meeting will be \u201cless productive\u201d than in previous years because one third of the regional grouping\u2019s leaders are not present for the summit in Palau, where China-Taiwan tensions are front and center, experts told Radio Free Asia. Leaders from five of the 18 member nations \u2014 Fiji, Vanuatu, Samoa, Kiribati, and New Caledonia \u2014 sent deputy ministers or other senior officials in their stead. A sixth leader, Solomon Islands Prime Minister Matthew Wale, had arrived in Palau, but returned to Honiara to address a no-confidence filing against his leadership. \u201cThe meeting is already less productive because as a political meeting, without leaders, it cannot be viewed as being productive,\u201d Alan Tidwell, director of the Center for Australian, New Zealand and Pacific Studies at Georgetown University in Washington, told RFA. \u201cBeing productive means having leaders in the room.\u201d The theme of this year\u2019s forum meeting uses the Palauan word for Palau as an acronym \u2013 B.E.L.A.U., Building Economies: Life. Action. Unity. But the invitation of Taiwan as a development partner, and China as a dialogue partner, has left the countries of the Pacific Islands Forum, or PIF, anything but unified. Palau President Surangel S. Whipps Jr. and Taiwan's Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung during the inauguration of Taiwan-funded solar energy and electric bus projects in Koror, Aug. 30, 2026, ahead of the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting. (Saeed Khan/AFP) China-Taiwan rivalry Palau is one of three Pacific countries and one of 12 globally that maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan. As host nation, Palau took the traditional role of inviting the non-member countries to the forum meeting alongside the PIF Secretariat, which determined that Taipei was eligible to participate as a development partner under the 1992 PIF framework. Palau\u2019s President Surangel Whipps Jr.\u2019s decision to include democratic Taiwan, which mainland communist China considers to be a rogue province, angered Beijing. After Taiwan\u2019s Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung attended the PIF meeting\u2019s opening ceremony on Monday, Qian Bo, China\u2019s Pacific envoy, warned that there would be consequences, without specifying what the consequences were. China's special envoy for Pacific Affairs Qian Bo leaves after attending the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting in Koror, Sept. 1, 2026. (Saeed Khan/AFP) Though Qian said this was not a threat, Gregory Brown, Director of The Alliance Futures Initiative, a Washington-based think tank, said it was \u201ca precisely calibrated threat in Pacific diplomacy.\u201d \u201cIt likely means tourism bans, frozen loans, and delayed projects for anyone who sat in the same room as Taiwan\u2019s foreign minister,\u201d he said, adding that Palau was the most likely target for retaliation. He said China could put economic pressures on Palau, noting that Beijing devastated Palau\u2019s tourism industry in 2017 by declaring it unsafe for Chinese tourists. Prior to then, around 40% of Palau\u2019s tourism income came from China. China warned its citizens not to travel to Palau in an advisory on Aug. 19, about 10 days before the forum, a move that was criticized by the United States Embassy in Koror as weaponization of tourism. Qian defended Beijing\u2019s advisory to reporters on Monday. \u201cThat weapon is still loaded,\u201d Brown said, referring to the advisory. \u201cWe may already be seeing the first consequence play out.\u201d Taiwan's Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung speaks on the sidelines of the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting in Koror, Palau, Sept. 1, 2026. (Saeed Khan/AFP) AFP reported that Chinese officials warned the delegations of the PIF countries that they should not attend any side events at the meeting that include Taiwan, citing a Pacific source at the meeting on condition of anonymity. Lin defended Taiwan\u2019s participation Tuesday, telling reporters that Taipei has been a significant donor to the Pacific, and has been involved with the meeting for decades. \u201cWe should not make compromises just because of China\u2019s recent bullying,\u201d Lin said. \u201cWherever there is Taiwan\u2019s presence, China will have a difficult time having full control over the area.\u201d But Beijing on Tuesday doubled down on its assertion that Taiwan does not belong. Taiwan \u201cis not qualified to participate in the forum\u2019s activities in any capacity,\u201d Guo Jiakun, a spokesperson for the Chinese foreign ministry told reporters in Beijing. \u201cAuthorities in Taiwan have sent independence separatists such as Lin Chia-lung to make sneaky visits and curry favour everywhere in a futile attempt to attract attention.\u201d Tuvalu's Prime Minister Feleti Teo arrives for a meeting during the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting in Koror, Sept. 1, 2026. (Saeed Khan/AFP) One-third of leaders absent While four of the five leaders who did not fly to Palau cited pressing domestic issues as the reason they could not attend, the fifth, President Taneiti Maamau of Kiribati said he was unable to attend because the country\u2019s parliament was in session and a lack of available commercial flights. In his stead, David Teaabo, the country\u2019s former ambassador to China, was sent to lead the delegation. The move was widely interpreted as a snub aimed at both Palau and Taiwan. New Zealand\u2019s Foreign Minister Winston Peters told reporters that denying that foreign influence had a role in the absences would \u201cdefy gravity and logic,\u201d telling Australia\u2019s ABC News that the absences were \u201chighly suspicious.\u201d New Zealand's Foreign Minister Winston Peters, right, at the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting in Koror, Palau, Aug. 31, 2026. (Saeed Khan/AFP) Tidwell called the Kiribati flights excuse \u201cabsurd,\u201d and said that the absence of so many of the forum member countries\u2019 leaders undermines the PIF meeting. \u201cIt will be remembered as the meeting at which almost a third of the leadership didn\u2019t attend,\u201d he said. \u201cFrom Washington\u2019s perspective the deputy secretary of state is attending. This has been touted in Washington as a strong signal of how important the Pacific is for Washington.\u201d Tidwell explained that in previous years it would have been the Secretary of Interior that attends and that Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau\u2019s participation was supposed to be \u201ca success.\u201d \u201cBut who is he meeting with?\u201d said Tidwell. \u201cThe real test will be to see how he\u2019s met when he visits Tarawa.\u201d Kiribati is a scheduled stop on Landau\u2019s three-country itinerary in the Pacific after the PIF meeting concludes Friday. According to the U.S. State Department, he will attend the Kiribati Development Partners Forum there, as well as having meetings with government representatives. In last year\u2019s forum held in the Solomon Islands, then Prime Minister Jeremiah Manele, widely considered to be a pro-Chinese politician, decided not to involve any outside nations, and this was seen as a way to prevent Taiwan from attending. Brown praised Palau for its strategy of inclusivity. \u201cLast year, the Solomons solved the Taiwan problem by locking the door on everybody,\u201d he said. \u201cThis year, Palau solved it by opening the door to everybody and telling China to behave like a guest instead of a landlord.\u201d He said President Whipps\u2019 approach was better than Manele\u2019s. \u201cIn my opinion, Whipps\u2019 approach is the right one,\u201d he said. \u201cIt considers Pacific sovereignty as something Pacific states exercise by making their own decisions about who sits at the table.\u201d Edited by Charlie Dharapak.","title":"Pacific Islands Forum meeting \u2018less productive\u2019 with a third of its leaders absent","topic":"Pacific","translation_language":"","url":"https://rfa.org/english/pacific/2026/09/01/pacific-islands-forum-meeting-palau-taiwan-china/","video_url":null},{"article_body_paragraphs":[],"audio_source_url":null,"author":"Taejun Kang for RFA","available_dubs":[],"downloadable_assets":["https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/PL6KDEMRLJGCTDIDZW5WI24YSM.jpg?auth=d0198463e7dd150d62ff579dcbe4f69541cd00fec6afa49f1f27001b04bc2ed6&smart=true&width=1500"],"duration_display":"0:00","duration_seconds":null,"embed_url":null,"id":11077,"image_caption":"A Nov.  5, 2022, photo shows supporters of Chiang Wan-an, grandson of the late president Chiang Kai-shek from the main opposition Kuomintang (KMT) at a campaign rally in New Taipei City.","image_url":"https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/PL6KDEMRLJGCTDIDZW5WI24YSM.jpg?auth=d0198463e7dd150d62ff579dcbe4f69541cd00fec6afa49f1f27001b04bc2ed6&smart=true&width=1500","is_clip":false,"item_type":"article","item_type_label":"Article","language_label":"English","media_credit":"Taejun Kang for RFA","micro_label":"Photo","micro_label_kind":"gallery","network_label":"RFA","network_logo_url":"/static/uploads/direct_network_logos/rfa_ca00144ac549.png","published_at":"2026-08-31T20:38:10","published_at_display":"31 Aug 2026, 20:38 GMT","sequence_badge_label":null,"sequence_count":null,"sequence_count_label":null,"sequence_frames":[],"sequence_kind":null,"source_name":"rfa_english_rss","source_name_label":"RFA English RSS","source_type":"rss","summary":"China is likely to use artificial intelligence to influence Taiwan\u2019s Nov. 28 local elections, analysts told Radio Free Asia. Taiwan\u2019s ruling Democratic Progressive Party, or DPP, warned this month that Beijing could use AI to target groups of voters, impersonate Taiwanese social media users and circulate fabricated recordings or scandals shortly before election day. The warning comes as Taipei steps up its defenses against AI interference in the election regardless of whether it originates inside or outside of the democratic island, which China considers to be its territory. Taiwan\u2019s government rejects Beijing\u2019s sovereignty claim and says the island\u2019s future can be decided only by its people. Researchers say influence operators can use AI to produce content more quickly, manage networks of fake accounts and tailor messages to individual voters. \u201cI do think that AI will be more involved in the November local elections,\u201d Sze-Fung Lee, an independent researcher specializing in Chinese hybrid warfare, told RFA. \u201cThe use of AI has been observed repeatedly in previous elections, and I believe we will continue to see it in the form of deepfakes for defamation campaigns, coordinated inauthentic behavior, and more sophisticated microtargeting.\u201d People ride past campaign ads for presidential and parliamentary candidates ahead of the general election in Taipei, Jan. 12, 2024. (Ann Wang/Reuters) China has a long history of interfering in Taiwan\u2019s elections, and it will likely use AI as it continues its efforts, William Yang, a Northeast Asia analyst at the Belgium-based International Crisis Group, told RFA. \u201cI do think Taiwan has legitimate reason to worry about Chinese election interference assisted by advanced AI technology,\u201d Yang said. \u201cNow with the assistance of advanced AI technology, these efforts will certainly be on the rise, especially when it coincides with key election cycles.\u201d Beijing has repeatedly denied interfering in Taiwan\u2019s elections. It accuses the DPP of promoting separatism and using tensions with China for political purposes. Electoral context The DPP\u2019s warning comes as the party faces a difficult local election. The opposition Kuomintang, or KMT, won 14 mayoral and county chief posts in 2022, compared with five for the DPP, and has secured a majority of those positions in the past two local election cycles. Yang said the KMT was currently projected to win more counties, although the DPP could seriously challenge it in several races. \u201cThe DPP will certainly be closely monitoring and tracking signs of disinformation that is trying to undermine its electoral prospects and find clues that might suggest its connection to China,\u201d he said. The KMT supports greater engagement with Beijing but rejects descriptions of itself as pro-China. The DPP, meanwhile, supports closer relationships with countries like the United States and Japan. Newly elected opposition Kuomintang leader Cheng Li-wun delivers her speech during the party's National Congress in Taipei, Nov. 1, 2025. (I-hwa Cheng/AFP) In a statement issued in February about reports of Chinese preparations to influence the local elections, the KMT said it opposed interference by external actors. Despite the major differences the two parties have in cross-straits relations, Taiwan\u2019s local elections are generally driven more by domestic issues. In 2022, the DPP emphasized national security and resistance to Beijing but suffered its worst local election result in years, prompting then-President Tsai Ing-wen to resign as party chair. 2024 influence? In its warning, the DPP said AI-generated material that circulated around Taiwan\u2019s 2024 presidential election included videos promoting \u201cThe Secret History of Tsai Ing-wen,\u201d \u2013 an electronic book containing allegations about the former president \u2013 and a suspected fake recording of Terry Gou, a businessman and former presidential hopeful. Research by Taiwan-based civil society group Doublethink Lab found that generative AI was used during the 2024 election to conduct large-scale spam campaigns and help inauthentic accounts vary their posts and schedules. In previous elections, manipulation campaigns relied more on direct amplification of Chinese state media and prominent Weibo users, but in 2024, most of the interference came from unofficial social media accounts, Doublethink Lab found. However, attributing such activity to China can be difficult, the report said. The presence of AI-generated material does not establish who created it, and researchers must examine account networks, posting behavior and connections with state-backed media or other known actors. Voters cast their ballot for the presidential election at a polling station in Taipei on Jan. 13, 2024. (I-hwa Cheng/AFP) AI could make attribution harder by allowing operators to imitate Taiwanese expressions, discuss local issues and vary their online behavior. A February report by the Netherlands-based Leiden Asia Centre said AI could make disinformation cheaper and easier to produce at scale. It found, however, that manipulation in Taiwan drew much of its power from existing political polarization, social grievances and social media platforms that reward emotionally charged content. The report indicated that AI could amplify existing political divisions rather than create new ones. Shoring up defenses Taiwan\u2019s Central Election Commission is establishing a specialized task force and an online platform through which candidates can report suspected deepfakes. The commission plans to assess reported material and refer confirmed cases to online platforms for action. Such a system could help authorities respond to fabricated recordings attributed to identifiable candidates. Coordinated networks may be harder to address when individual accounts post political opinions or misleading claims that are not demonstrably false. Content circulating through closed online communities, including those found on the popular LINE messenger app, also presents a challenge because it is less visible to election officials, researchers and fact-checkers. The election preparations come amid broader concerns about Chinese cyber activity. Taiwan\u2019s National Security Bureau said critical infrastructure faced an average of 2.63 million Chinese cyberattacks a day in 2025, an increase of 6% from 2024 and 113% from 2023. Some of the attacks coincided with Chinese military exercises or politically significant events in Taiwan, the bureau said. The cyberattack figures do not demonstrate AI-enabled election interference, but Lee said they supported the government\u2019s broader assessment of sustained Chinese pressure. \u201cI do not think the government is being overly sensitive,\u201d she said. \u201cThere is hard data showing the frequency of cyberattacks and cognitive warfare targeting Taiwan every day, as well as evidence of Chinese electoral interference in Taiwan\u2019s 2024 presidential election.\u201d Edited by Eugene Whong.","title":"Taiwan steps up AI defenses as China election interference fears grow","topic":"China","translation_language":"","url":"https://rfa.org/english/china/2026/08/31/taiwan-election-interference-china-ai/","video_url":null},{"article_body_paragraphs":[],"audio_source_url":null,"author":"Bryan Manabat for RFA","available_dubs":[],"downloadable_assets":["https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/Y6FFS3ZFS5BZXGEY25TJXJTQ64.jpg?auth=4fb07a1ad016fd3c4c1d139ff5c7122c9f3c7ca6ab2400d38aecbe0aefa3a6d1&smart=true&width=1500"],"duration_display":"0:00","duration_seconds":null,"embed_url":null,"id":10261,"image_caption":"Polymetallic nodules, misshapen black globes encrusted with coveted metals like cobalt, nickel and manganese, onboard the research vessel in Rarotonga, Cook Islands, June 11, 2025.","image_url":"https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/Y6FFS3ZFS5BZXGEY25TJXJTQ64.jpg?auth=4fb07a1ad016fd3c4c1d139ff5c7122c9f3c7ca6ab2400d38aecbe0aefa3a6d1&smart=true&width=1500","is_clip":false,"item_type":"article","item_type_label":"Article","language_label":"English","media_credit":"Bryan Manabat for RFA","micro_label":"Photo","micro_label_kind":"gallery","network_label":"RFA","network_logo_url":"/static/uploads/direct_network_logos/rfa_ca00144ac549.png","published_at":"2026-08-28T23:43:00","published_at_display":"28 Aug 2026, 23:43 GMT","sequence_badge_label":null,"sequence_count":null,"sequence_count_label":null,"sequence_frames":[],"sequence_kind":null,"source_name":"rfa_english_rss","source_name_label":"RFA English RSS","source_type":"rss","summary":"SAIPAN, Northern Mariana Islands \u2014 As the U.S. government moves forward with plans to open more than 65 million acres of federal waters around the Northern Mariana Islands to potential seabed mineral exploration, business leaders and Indigenous advocates told Radio Free Asia the U.S. territory must not be sidelined in decisions driven partly by national\u2011security priorities. The proposed leasing notice, released August 17 by the Marine Minerals Administration, or MMA, follows earlier steps identifying vast areas of ocean for possible mineral development around the territory, officially called the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, or CNMI. The plan has triggered intense debate across the islands, where concerns span environmental risks, cultural impacts, fisheries, tourism, and democratic accountability. Though the plan could be economically beneficial, the business community in the CNMI is approaching it with caution, Joshua Wise, president of the Saipan Chamber of Commerce, told RFA. This map shows the mineral lease sale areas near CNMI as identified by the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, or BOEM. In July, BOEM was reunified with the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement to form the Marine Minerals Administration. (MMA) \u201cThere are legitimate concerns, but there may also be significant economic opportunities that deserve to be fully understood,\u201d Wise said, adding that critical minerals have become central to U.S. national security, manufacturing, technology, and supply\u2011chain resilience \u2014 meaning the CNMI could become part of a broader federal strategy. \u201cIf resources located near the CNMI ultimately become part of that national strategy, then we should be asking what role the Commonwealth will have and what economic opportunities could be created here,\u201d he said. Resource rivalry The push for offshore critical minerals comes as the United States and China compete for control of the materials that power modern technology \u2014 including batteries, semiconductors, electric vehicles, renewable\u2011energy systems, and advanced defense platforms. China currently dominates global processing of rare earth elements, cobalt, nickel, graphite, and battery components, giving it significant leverage over global supply chains. U.S. officials have warned that this dependence poses strategic vulnerabilities for national security and manufacturing. \u201cCritical minerals are essential to America\u2019s national security, economic strength and resource sovereignty,\u201d Matt Giacona, acting director of the MMA, said in the Aug. 17 announcement. \u201cThe United States cannot afford to depend on foreign nations for the resources that power our economy and support our defense industrial base. The Marine Minerals Administration is working to unlock the critical mineral potential of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf responsibly, transparently and with the rigorous environmental review the American people expect.\u201d Washington is exploring new sources of critical minerals, including the deep ocean, where polymetallic nodules and crusts contain metals essential for clean\u2011energy and defense technologies. MMA\u2019s interest in CNMI waters is the potential future node in U.S. supply\u2011chain resilience efforts. History has shown what can happen when national\u2011security priorities override local interests, Gregorie Michael Towai (Eip\u00e9r\u00e1ng), a researcher of and advocate for indigenous people in the territory, told RFA. He cited the 67 U.S. nuclear tests in the Marshall Islands between 1946 and 1958 and the long\u2011term contamination there, as well as the continuing discovery of unexploded ordnance across the Marianas as lessons from history. The abandoned Pacific Barrier Radar III in Saipan, Northern Mariana Islands, June 27, 2024. (Yuichi Yamazaki/AFP) \u201cDecisions justified by national security can create consequences for Pacific communities that endure long after the strategic circumstances that originally justified them have changed.\u201d Towai stressed that deep\u2011sea mining is not equivalent to nuclear testing \u2014 but the imbalance of power is similar. He said the CNMI must insist on credible independent science, meaningful public participation, and enforceable guarantees before any commitments are made. Consultation, he said, must be capable of changing the decision, not merely documenting that communities were heard. \u201cNational security matters, but the security of Pacific communities matters too. That includes clean water, healthy fisheries, cultural continuity, food security, and the ability of future generations to inherit an environment that has not been irreversibly altered,\u201d Towai added. Red flags Even if the plan provides contracts for CNMI companies and jobs for its people, there are unanswered questions surrounding how exploration or mineral development could affect industries that already sustain the CNMI, Wise said. \u201cOur marine environment directly supports industries that already exist today, particularly tourism and fisheries,\u201d he said. \u201cSo we need a much clearer understanding of what future exploration or mineral development could mean for those industries.\u201d People walk past a beach during sunset in Saipan, Northern Mariana Islands on June 27, 2024. (Yuichi Yamazaki/AFP) Wise said the CNMI needs baseline environmental data, protections for fisheries, and much greater clarity about both risks and benefits. \u201cThe question should be: if this moves forward, can it be done responsibly, can our existing industries be protected, and will the people and businesses of the CNMI have a meaningful seat at the table and a meaningful share in the opportunities that may result?\u201d he said. Government officials said that they need other assurances prior to the plan being enacted. In public statements, CNMI Governor David M. Apatang said the federal notice triggers a 60\u2011day review period during which the CNMI will insist on strict environmental and cultural safeguards, while U.S. Delegate Kimberlyn King\u2011Hinds said that she is advancing legislation to secure revenue sharing, mandatory mitigation studies, and formal consultation with CNMI leaders. But the CNMI\u2019s legal authority over offshore waters remains limited. It can demand safeguards and challenge inadequate environmental review, but it cannot block the MMA from advancing leasing in federal waters. Under the Covenant and federal court rulings, submerged lands beyond the 12\u2011mile territorial sea fall under exclusive federal jurisdiction. But the Pacific Ocean is more than just a boundary for people native to the Pacific, Towai said. \u201cFor Indigenous peoples of Oceania, the ocean is part of our homeland,\u201d he said. \u201cDecisions about the seabed cannot be evaluated exclusively through mineral values, lease blocks, and federal jurisdiction.\u201d Edited by Eugene Whong.","title":"Marianas voices demand a seat at the table in U.S. seabed mining proposal","topic":"Pacific","translation_language":"","url":"https://rfa.org/english/pacific/2026/08/28/cnmi-mining-supply-chain-minerals/","video_url":null},{"article_body_paragraphs":[],"audio_source_url":null,"author":"Noh Jung Min for RFA, Dolkar, Dickey Kundol, and Tawang for RFA Tibetan","available_dubs":[],"downloadable_assets":["https://d3ayjbmlrrjm3o.cloudfront.net/wp-radiofreeasia/RFA_Video/20260828/6a90fd2f205f30347c97886a/t_6ff7e857262f4142ac3a39fcf81f098c_name_Flood___3/file_540x960-1600-v4.mp4","https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/NMXTQCCBGJG73MZVURN3IG7AGA.png?auth=7569a53a60fe3fc05becc9a599151bfdfa19b5e12183d22a142530c2a31f4132&smart=true&width=1500"],"duration_display":"0:00","duration_seconds":null,"embed_url":null,"id":11312,"image_caption":"An aerial view shows the aftermath of flooding in Trishuli, Nuwakot district, Nepal,  Aug. 27.","image_url":"https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/NMXTQCCBGJG73MZVURN3IG7AGA.png?auth=7569a53a60fe3fc05becc9a599151bfdfa19b5e12183d22a142530c2a31f4132&smart=true&width=1500","is_clip":true,"item_type":"video","item_type_label":"Video","language_label":"English","media_credit":"Noh Jung Min for RFA, Dolkar, Dickey Kundol, and Tawang for RFA Tibetan","micro_label":"Video report","micro_label_kind":"video","network_label":"RFA","network_logo_url":"/static/uploads/direct_network_logos/rfa_ca00144ac549.png","published_at":"2026-08-27T20:44:09","published_at_display":"27 Aug 2026, 20:44 GMT","sequence_badge_label":null,"sequence_count":null,"sequence_count_label":null,"sequence_frames":[],"sequence_kind":null,"source_name":"rfa_english_rss","source_name_label":"RFA English RSS","source_type":"rss","summary":"Advocates call on Chinese authorities to allow information transparency in Tibet\u2019s rescue and relief efforts.","title":"Satellite imagery shows extensive damage from Nepal-Tibet border floods","topic":"Tibet","translation_language":"","url":"https://rfa.org/english/tibet/2026/08/27/tibet-nepal-flood-landslide-blackout/","video_url":"https://d3ayjbmlrrjm3o.cloudfront.net/wp-radiofreeasia/RFA_Video/20260828/6a90fd2f205f30347c97886a/t_6ff7e857262f4142ac3a39fcf81f098c_name_Flood___3/file_540x960-1600-v4.mp4"},{"article_body_paragraphs":[],"audio_source_url":null,"author":"Noh Jung Min for RFA, Dolkar, Dickey Kundol, and Tawang for RFA Tibetan","available_dubs":[],"downloadable_assets":["https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/NMXTQCCBGJG73MZVURN3IG7AGA.png?auth=7569a53a60fe3fc05becc9a599151bfdfa19b5e12183d22a142530c2a31f4132&smart=true&width=1500"],"duration_display":"0:00","duration_seconds":null,"embed_url":null,"id":9819,"image_caption":"An aerial view shows the aftermath of flooding in Trishuli, Nuwakot district, Nepal,  Aug. 27.","image_url":"https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/NMXTQCCBGJG73MZVURN3IG7AGA.png?auth=7569a53a60fe3fc05becc9a599151bfdfa19b5e12183d22a142530c2a31f4132&smart=true&width=1500","is_clip":false,"item_type":"article","item_type_label":"Article","language_label":"English","media_credit":"Noh Jung Min for RFA, Dolkar, Dickey Kundol, and Tawang for RFA Tibetan","micro_label":"Photo","micro_label_kind":"gallery","network_label":"RFA","network_logo_url":"/static/uploads/direct_network_logos/rfa_ca00144ac549.png","published_at":"2026-08-27T20:44:09","published_at_display":"27 Aug 2026, 20:44 GMT","sequence_badge_label":null,"sequence_count":null,"sequence_count_label":null,"sequence_frames":[],"sequence_kind":null,"source_name":"rfa_english_rss","source_name_label":"RFA English RSS","source_type":"rss","summary":"Satellite imagery taken at the Nepal-Tibet border shows extensive destruction from flooding and landslides that inundated the area Wednesday leaving hundreds of people dead or missing, but information from the Chinese-controlled side of the border is severely lacking, Tibetan rights activists told Radio Free Asia. Satellite imagery shows extensive damage from Nepal-Tibet border floods A comparison of imagery taken Aug. 23 and Aug. 27 of Tibet\u2019s Kyirong County (Gyirong in Chinese), and Nepal\u2019s Rasuwa district, shows that customs buildings, a bridge and other infrastructure on the border appear to have been swept away in the carnage. Restaurants, hotels, homes, and other buildings downstream on the Nepal side also appear to have been destroyed or washed away. Further downstream, much of Timure village appears to have disappeared in the latest imagery, underscoring the scale of the disaster and raising concerns about casualties and property loss. China\u2019s state-run Xinhua news agency reported that the disaster also caused extensive infrastructure damage \u2014 about 3 kilometers (2.8 miles) of the G216 highway leading to Kyirong Port were damaged, and five telecommunications base stations initially stopped operating. The Chinese government is severely restricting detailed information about the situation inside Tibet, Ryan Fioresi, executive director at Washington-based International Campaign for Tibet, or ICT, told RFA citing sources on the ground. \u201cChinese authorities have relocated local residents, barred journalists, independent observers, and others from entering the affected area, and prevented reliable firsthand information from emerging,\u201d he said. \u201cAs a result, the international community remains largely dependent on Chinese state media, whose coverage has focused primarily on Xi Jinping\u2019s directives and official accounts of rescue and relief efforts, rather than the actual conditions on the ground, survivors\u2019 experiences, or the full extent of the casualties and destruction.\u201d Lobsang Yangtso, a senior environmental researcher at the International Tibet Network, said she was concerned that the Chinese government has been engaged in large-scale construction projects in Tibet, a region that is geographically vulnerable to disasters such as earthquakes and flooding. She called on Chinese authorities to publicly and transparently release information about casualties and missing people. In total, at least 1,468 people were missing and 392 were confirmed dead according to AFP at the time of writing. On the Nepalese side, the disaster has also devastated Tibetan communities in Rasuwa district. As of August 27, Chinese authorities said three people had died and 558 were missing in Kyirong County. At the time of the disaster, hundreds of people were believed to be in the vicinity of the Kyirong border crossing including villagers, border staff, freight and construction workers, merchants, and non-Chinese citizen tourists. Tibetan casualties in Nepal Sources within the Tibetan diaspora told RFA that many Tibetans living in Nepal were affected by the disaster. The homes and property of five Tibetan households in the town of Timure were swept away by floodwaters, according to a statement from the Tibetan Refugee Welfare Office in Nepal. Members of two Tibetan families remained out of contact, while members of three other families escaped to higher ground and survived. Damaged road leading to Kyirong Port following a mudslide, in Shigatse, Tibet Autonomous Region, Aug. 27, 2026. (China Daily via Reuters) In the Gegyeling Tibetan settlement in Rasuwa district, 11 houses and the surrounding area were swept away. The whereabouts and condition of some of the residents remain unclear. Sources familiar with the situation also told RFA that floodwaters swept away a Tibetan in the Shabrubesi market area, also in Rasuwa. Sikyong Penpa Tsering, president of the Central Tibetan Administration, the exile government in Dharamshala, India, later reported the same statistics, adding that in Gegyeling, two elderly residents were still missing. He also provided an update on the situation in Shabrubesi, which he said was largely swept away, one Tibetan was killed and three others remained missing. In Timure, he said, six people from two Tibetan families were reported missing. Nepalese authorities had rescued six Tibetans as of the morning of August 27, Tsering said. Three other Tibetan settlements in Nepal \u2014 Thangpoche, Khangjim and Biritim, also known as Briddim \u2014 were not affected because their homes are located at higher elevations. The Dalai Lama, Tibet\u2019s exiled spiritual leader, expressed his condolences Thursday, acknowledging that the disaster had caused heavy damage and loss of life. \u201cI hope that appropriate follow-up measures will be taken, wherever possible, to help ensure that such disasters do not recur,\u201d he said. The exact cause and sequence of the disaster remains under investigation and experts cautioned against prematurely describing the disaster as simply a glacial collapse, as many international media outlets had been reporting. The evidence points to a very large slope failure involving both rock and glacier ice on the northern side of the Langtang Lirung massif, Tenzing Chogyal Sherpa, a physical geographer at Utrecht University in the Netherlands, told RFA. \u201cWhat is clear is that this was not simply a conventional river flood,\u201d Sherpa said. \u201cA very large volume of rock and ice moved rapidly downslope and entered the river system, producing an extraordinary amount of debris and sediment.\u201d He said he preferred the more cautious term \u201clarge rock-ice avalanche\u201d until further evidence is available. Tibetan blackout The Chinese government deployed hundreds of emergency responders, firefighters, engineers and military personnel to the area, China\u2019s state-run Xinhua news agency reported. Authorities are also monitoring a landslide-dammed lake upstream from the border crossing. Xinhua reported that the water level had risen compared with the previous evening, raising concerns about a possible secondary disaster. Experts and advocates told RFA that they are calling for better monitoring of high-altitude source areas, stronger river-level early warning systems, rapid communication between upstream and downstream communities, and, particularly in transboundary river basins, much stronger sharing of information across borders. Nepal\u2019s rescue efforts on its side of the border are more transparent than the Chinese government\u2019s response on the Tibetan side, Tencho Gyatso, president of ICT, told RFA. \u201cWhile Nepal is providing timely information and avenues for international humanitarian assistance, we hope that, in Tibet, disaster relief efforts will be accompanied by timely and transparent information and unhindered access for humanitarian support,\u201d she said. Edited by Eugene Whong.","title":"Satellite imagery shows extensive damage from Nepal-Tibet border floods","topic":"Tibet","translation_language":"","url":"https://rfa.org/english/tibet/2026/08/27/tibet-nepal-flood-landslide-blackout/","video_url":null},{"article_body_paragraphs":[],"audio_source_url":null,"author":"Meng Ou for RFA Mandarin","available_dubs":[],"downloadable_assets":["https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/A3TDI7MNVJCHNKWZTFS5A7SOFQ.JPG?auth=0d972be8d3abdecd971c7483a17df791f4a50d79617212faa793cf9fc600b596&smart=true&width=1500"],"duration_display":"0:00","duration_seconds":null,"embed_url":null,"id":8969,"image_caption":"A man walks into West Kowloon Magistrates' Courts ahead of the national security verdict for three former leaders of a disbanded group that organized annual Tiananmen Square vigils, charged with inciting subversion of state power, in Hong Kong, Aug. 21, 2026.","image_url":"https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/A3TDI7MNVJCHNKWZTFS5A7SOFQ.JPG?auth=0d972be8d3abdecd971c7483a17df791f4a50d79617212faa793cf9fc600b596&smart=true&width=1500","is_clip":false,"item_type":"article","item_type_label":"Article","language_label":"English","media_credit":"Meng Ou for RFA Mandarin","micro_label":"Photo","micro_label_kind":"gallery","network_label":"RFA","network_logo_url":"/static/uploads/direct_network_logos/rfa_ca00144ac549.png","published_at":"2026-08-25T19:50:59","published_at_display":"25 Aug 2026, 19:50 GMT","sequence_badge_label":null,"sequence_count":null,"sequence_count_label":null,"sequence_frames":[],"sequence_kind":null,"source_name":"rfa_english_rss","source_name_label":"RFA English RSS","source_type":"rss","summary":"Read a version of this story at RFA Mandarin A Hong Kong court this month convicted two leaders of a dissolved pro-democracy group to erase the memory of the Tiananmen Square Massacre, a pro-democracy activist who was a student leader during the 1989 event told Radio Free Asia. The Hong Kong High Court ruled Aug. 21 that the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China, its former chairman Lee Cheuk-yan and its former vice-chairwoman Chow Hang-tung, were guilty of \u201cinciting subversion of state power.\u201d The Alliance is best known for organizing yearly candlelight vigils in Hong Kong\u2019s Victoria Park each year in remembrance of the Tiananmen incident, a practice that continued until 2019. In 2020 authorities stopped the vigil citing health concerns during the pandemic, then from 2021 onward they were able to use Hong Kong\u2019s draconian National Security Law to end it permanently. Erasing the past The verdict is intended to discourage commemorations of the Tiananmen Square Massacre, Wang Dan, who was a student leader of the protests in 1989, told RFA. \u201cThe authorities clearly hope to use this verdict to erase every trace of history and prevent Hong Kong people from remembering June 4th,\u201d he said, referring to the massacre by the date which it occurred, as is customary in Chinese. Hong Kong pro-democracy activists Lee Cheuk-yan, left, and Chow Hang-tung posing during photo sessions in Hong Kong on March 21, 2021. (Peter Parks/AFP) Wang said that he does not believe authorities can succeed in erasing the event from the public consciousness. \u201cSuch a verdict will only lead more people to commemorate it in silence,\u201d he said. \u201cSilent remembrance is still remembrance. The memories people carry in their hearts cannot be completely destroyed by such brutal acts.\u201d In September 2021, authorities arrested Lee, Chow, and another former chairman of the Alliance, Albert Ho, with \u201cinciting subversion of state power.\u201d The Alliance voted to dissolve on Sept. 25 of that year. Lee and Chow were held in custody until the trial, which began in January of this year. Ho was initially held in custody but was briefly let out on bail for medical grounds in 2022, then returned into custody in 2023. Ho pleaded guilty while Lee and Chow both pleaded innocent. The court on Aug. 21 found Lee, Chow, and the disbanded organization guilty. Legal argument A core point of contention in this case is the Hong Kong Alliance\u2019s long-standing call to \u201cend one-party rule.\u201d The court held that after the implementation of the National Security Law in 2020, the Hong Kong Alliance and its leaders continued to promote this goal and incited others to carry out acts of subversion of state power by illegal means. A 2014 photo shows people attending a candlelight vigil in Victoria Park to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the June 4th Tiananmen crackdown. (RFA) During the trial, Lee and Chow argued that \u201cending one-party rule\u201d was about promoting democratic transition and did not equate to demanding an end to the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, while also believing that related political expressions were protected by freedom of speech in Hong Kong. However, the court did not accept this argument. The Hong Kong Police National Security Department stated that the court\u2019s ruling was in line with their view of the case. The police also noted that the Alliance continued to hold rallies, exhibitions, street campaigns, and online memorial activities after the law went into effect. Sentences are yet to be determined, but the two could face up to 10 years in prison. Edited by Eugene Whong.","title":"Hong Kong court verdict aims to erase Tiananmen memory, 1989 student protester says","topic":"China","translation_language":"","url":"https://rfa.org/english/china/2026/08/25/hkaspdmc-hong-kong-china-subversion/","video_url":null},{"article_body_paragraphs":[],"audio_source_url":null,"author":"Taejun Kang for RFA","available_dubs":[],"downloadable_assets":["https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/5YK7CSKI7BFNBPH73NILMKG4GY.jpg?auth=78977eae14bbea05d950ffa8c2abec7e12f3fe38d3c1be8d5b11b7de4eda0aab&smart=true&width=1500"],"duration_display":"0:00","duration_seconds":null,"embed_url":null,"id":8616,"image_caption":"Crew members of Chinese People's Liberation Army navy ship Qi Jiguang wave as their ship prepares to dock past flags of China and Indonesia at Tanjung Perak Port in Surabaya on Aug. 2, 2026.","image_url":"https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/5YK7CSKI7BFNBPH73NILMKG4GY.jpg?auth=78977eae14bbea05d950ffa8c2abec7e12f3fe38d3c1be8d5b11b7de4eda0aab&smart=true&width=1500","is_clip":false,"item_type":"article","item_type_label":"Article","language_label":"English","media_credit":"Taejun Kang for RFA","micro_label":"Photo","micro_label_kind":"gallery","network_label":"RFA","network_logo_url":"/static/uploads/direct_network_logos/rfa_ca00144ac549.png","published_at":"2026-08-25T01:22:34","published_at_display":"25 Aug 2026, 01:22 GMT","sequence_badge_label":null,"sequence_count":null,"sequence_count_label":null,"sequence_frames":[],"sequence_kind":null,"source_name":"rfa_english_rss","source_name_label":"RFA English RSS","source_type":"rss","summary":"Though China\u2019s first-ever naval exercise with another country\u2019s military in waters east of Taiwan this month was a relatively small operation, it could go a long way toward normalizing Beijing\u2019s presence around the democratic island. The Chinese frigate Honghe and Indonesia\u2019s KRI I Gusti Ngurah Rai-332 conducted a passing exercise east of Taiwan on Aug. 12, involving maritime communications, formation maneuvers and replenishment of fuel and supplies at sea. Reuters described it as China\u2019s first joint operation with a foreign military in those waters. China, which considers Taiwan to be part of its own territory, described it as a \u201cnavigation exercise.\u201d Taiwan, however, accused Beijing of using the drill to create the impression that China exercises jurisdiction over waters east of the island. Though the exercise itself was a brief three-hour meeting of ships which then went their separate ways, the exercise gave Beijing a record of a foreign navy conducting an activity with China in waters that Taipei says Beijing has no authority to police, Aniello Iannone, a lecturer in Indonesian and Southeast Asian politics at Diponegoro University in Indonesia, told RFA. Chinese and Indonesian ships in a joint exercise east of Taiwan, Aug. 12, 2026. (Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China) \u201cOnce the Indonesian navy sailed, Beijing acquired something it could not manufacture alone, corroboration, from a state with no stake in the Taiwan question, that the water east of the island is a place where cooperation with China happens normally,\u201d he said. Taiwan\u2019s military said the exercise did not change much from a security perspective. Wu Tien-jen, assistant deputy chief of the general staff for intelligence, told lawmakers that the Indonesian vessel was already traveling through the area, and that the activity had no direct military impact on Taiwan, though he said it carried geopolitical significance. Jakarta played down the significance of the exercise, saying its warship was returning from exercises in Vladivostok and that such passing exercises were routine acts of maritime diplomacy. Normalizing China\u2019s presence Indonesia has diplomatically transitioned to a Taiwan stance that aligns with China\u2019s position more closely than many other governments\u2014including by issuing a joint statement affirming Beijing\u2019s one-China principle in November 2024. But its participation in exercises with China east of Taiwan does not mean that it intended to legitimize Beijing\u2019s presence in the area, Joseph Kristanto, a research analyst at Singapore\u2019s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, told RFA. \u201cFor Jakarta, it\u2019s just routine defense diplomacy activities. But for Taipei, the concern is the precedent that such an activity could create,\u201d he said. \u201cJakarta may not intend to lend legitimacy or normalize China\u2019s military presence around Taiwan, but Beijing can still use the participation of a foreign navy to reinforce the impression that its military activities in these waters are increasingly normal.\u201d The location gives the episode greater significance for Taiwan, according to analysts. Unlike Taiwan\u2019s western coast, which faces mainland China across the Taiwan Strait, its eastern approaches open onto the Pacific and are regarded as crucial maritime lifelines in the event of a Chinese blockade or conflict, and Taipei has become increasingly concerned about Chinese activity there. China\u2019s coast guard began patrols east of Taiwan in June, later drawing expressions of concern from the United States, Britain, France and Germany. Taiwan subsequently reported a sharp rise in Chinese government-vessel activity around the island and warned that Beijing could be testing ways to disrupt Pacific supply routes. This photograph released by Taiwan's Military News Agency shows soldiers driving a personnel vehicle into a warship near Taiwan during the annual Han Kuang drill on Aug. 22, 2016. (Taiwan Military News Agency via AFP) During its annual nationwide Han Kuang military exercises this month, Taiwan\u2019s navy and coast guard also held their first joint anti-blockade drill, including a scenario in which a merchant vessel carrying essential supplies was escorted toward ports in eastern Taiwan. \u201cThe eastern approaches are the only side of Taiwan not overlooked by the Chinese mainland,\u201d Iannone said. \u201cThat\u2019s where resupply would come from in a blockade, and where American forces would arrive.\u201d He argued that Chinese survey ships, coast guard patrols and now the Indonesia exercise could be understood as part of a broader attempt to make Beijing\u2019s presence east of Taiwan appear administrative and routine rather than exceptional. The more important test will be whether the Indonesia exercise remains an isolated event, Kristanto said. A single passing exercise, or PASSEX, \u201cis unlikely to change the status quo,\u201d he said. \u201cIt would become more strategically meaningful if this develops into a pattern whereby similar exercises occur repeatedly, involve more foreign navies, become operationally more complex, or take place closer to Taiwan.\u201d Altering geopolitical narratives The key threshold could come if other countries begin to regard cooperation with China in those waters as politically unremarkable, Kristanto said. \u201cIn that scenario, Beijing would not necessarily need countries like Indonesia to directly endorse its sovereignty claims,\u201d he said, adding that the cumulative effect could still help normalise the PLA\u2019s presence around the island. Repetition of this exercise with the navies of other countries would shift the burden of the argument, Iannone said. \u201cAgainst an event, Taipei can object,\u201d he said. \u201cAgainst a routine, Taipei has to ask the international system to un-normalize something already normalized, which is a far harder thing to organize.\u201d Iannone said more complex exercises, participation by additional navies or operations moving closer to Taiwan would strengthen Beijing\u2019s case, but he also pointed to a less visible, but possibly more valuable indicator: whether records of such cooperation are cited as evidence of established practice. \u201cThe one I\u2019d watch hardest is documents,\u201d Iannone said. If records of joint activities east of Taiwan began to appear in notifications from the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Maritime Organization, or in arguments that attempt to declare the territory part of China\u2019s exclusive economic zone, \u201cthat\u2019s the transition from imagery to legal material.\u201d But there are also limits to how much Beijing can gain from such exercises. Indonesian navy personnel pull the mooring line of Chinese People's Liberation Army navy ship Kunlun Shan at Tanjung Perak Port in Surabaya on Aug 2, 2026. (Juni Kriswanto/AFP) Kristanto said Indonesia retains control over how it describes its military cooperation and has been careful to characterize the Aug. 12 drill as limited and routine. Jakarta also conducts military exercises with a wide range of countries, meaning the China drill alone does not demonstrate a strategic realignment. Beijing could even undermine its own objective if it attaches too much political meaning to foreign participation, he said. \u201cIf China attaches too much political significance to those interactions, it could make partners who do not want to be entangled in the geopolitical competition between China and the U.S. and its allies more cautious about participating in similar activities in the future,\u201d Kristanto said. Indonesia and China nevertheless signaled this week that broader defense cooperation is continuing. During high-level \u201c2+2\u201d talks in Jakarta on Aug. 20, their foreign and defense ministers agreed to deepen security ties, including military exercises and defense industry cooperation. For Taiwan, however, the concern is less whether Indonesia itself moves closer to Beijing than whether similar interactions begin accumulating without attracting much resistance. \u201cEffective jurisdiction doesn\u2019t arrive through recognition, but it accumulates,\u201d Iannone said. \u201cNo sovereignty changes hands at any point, what it shifts is the threshold at which something registers as worth noticing, and that threshold is where the political work happens.\u201d Edited by Eugene Whong.","title":"Indonesia-China naval drill could help normalize Beijing\u2019s presence east of Taiwan","topic":"South China Sea","translation_language":"","url":"https://rfa.org/english/southchinasea/2026/08/25/indonesia-china-taiwan-east-exercise-navy/","video_url":null},{"article_body_paragraphs":[],"audio_source_url":null,"author":"Eugene Whong for RFA","available_dubs":[],"downloadable_assets":["https://d3ayjbmlrrjm3o.cloudfront.net/wp-radiofreeasia/20260821/6a88b0f717455663809d9e90/t_87f2fce847f54400b98e1dac1c59f0c2_name_tafi_long_interview/file_960x540-1600-v4.mp4","https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/5XE2DUOWWBAY5IPWPCRY4F4ROE.jpg?auth=404e36c3e1afe3660025b864b8bdc898d14c530800c03ae0b6b8180878045e98&smart=true&width=1500"],"duration_display":"0:00","duration_seconds":null,"embed_url":null,"id":11316,"image_caption":"Artists perform a Chinese dragon dance during a ceremony to mark the arrival of a Chinese naval hospital ship in Honiara, Solomon Islands Aug. 19, 2023.","image_url":"https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/5XE2DUOWWBAY5IPWPCRY4F4ROE.jpg?auth=404e36c3e1afe3660025b864b8bdc898d14c530800c03ae0b6b8180878045e98&smart=true&width=1500","is_clip":true,"item_type":"video","item_type_label":"Video","language_label":"English","media_credit":"Eugene Whong for RFA","micro_label":"Video report","micro_label_kind":"video","network_label":"RFA","network_logo_url":"/static/uploads/direct_network_logos/rfa_ca00144ac549.png","published_at":"2026-08-20T22:45:31","published_at_display":"20 Aug 2026, 22:45 GMT","sequence_badge_label":null,"sequence_count":null,"sequence_count_label":null,"sequence_frames":[],"sequence_kind":null,"source_name":"rfa_english_rss","source_name_label":"RFA English RSS","source_type":"rss","summary":"Report by the Alliance Futures Initiative documents how Beijing promoted the 15th FYP in the region","title":"China \u2018likely\u2019 ran targeted campaign to align Pacific with its latest five-year plan","topic":"Pacific","translation_language":"","url":"https://rfa.org/english/pacific/2026/08/20/china-pacific-five-year-plan-tafi/","video_url":"https://d3ayjbmlrrjm3o.cloudfront.net/wp-radiofreeasia/20260821/6a88b0f717455663809d9e90/t_87f2fce847f54400b98e1dac1c59f0c2_name_tafi_long_interview/file_960x540-1600-v4.mp4"},{"article_body_paragraphs":[],"audio_source_url":null,"author":"Eugene Whong for RFA","available_dubs":[],"downloadable_assets":["https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/5XE2DUOWWBAY5IPWPCRY4F4ROE.jpg?auth=404e36c3e1afe3660025b864b8bdc898d14c530800c03ae0b6b8180878045e98&smart=true&width=1500"],"duration_display":"0:00","duration_seconds":null,"embed_url":null,"id":7427,"image_caption":"Artists perform a Chinese dragon dance during a ceremony to mark the arrival of a Chinese naval hospital ship in Honiara, Solomon Islands Aug. 19, 2023.","image_url":"https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/5XE2DUOWWBAY5IPWPCRY4F4ROE.jpg?auth=404e36c3e1afe3660025b864b8bdc898d14c530800c03ae0b6b8180878045e98&smart=true&width=1500","is_clip":false,"item_type":"article","item_type_label":"Article","language_label":"English","media_credit":"Eugene Whong for RFA","micro_label":"Photo","micro_label_kind":"gallery","network_label":"RFA","network_logo_url":"/static/uploads/direct_network_logos/rfa_ca00144ac549.png","published_at":"2026-08-20T22:45:31","published_at_display":"20 Aug 2026, 22:45 GMT","sequence_badge_label":null,"sequence_count":null,"sequence_count_label":null,"sequence_frames":[],"sequence_kind":null,"source_name":"rfa_english_rss","source_name_label":"RFA English RSS","source_type":"rss","summary":"China \u201cvery likely\u201d coordinated a targeted campaign across the Pacific to demonstrate that local development strategies should align with Beijing\u2019s latest five-year-plan, a recent report by The Alliance Futures Initiative says. In the report, titled \u201cChina\u2019s Model on the Offensive: Why China\u2019s Five-Year Plan Promotion in the Pacific Matters ,\u201d the Washington-based think tank documented how in eight of the nine Pacific island countries where Beijing has an embassy, the heads of mission published op-eds in the local media touting the merits of China\u2019s latest sweeping national policy framework proposed late last year and formally adopted in March. \u201cTo international audiences, the PRC deliberately reframes the FYP from a domestic planning document into a predictable, scientific blueprint for global growth and cooperation,\u201d the report said. The campaign was not limited to media placement. Chinese diplomats also engaged in direct bilateral governance outreach, hosted diplomatic briefings \u2013 either open to the media or closed \u2013 with influential figures in business and government. The ultimate goal was to make the case that local development strategies were in line with the five-year plan, or that China was a more stable and reliable partner than its main rival with interests in the region, the United States. The Alliance Futures Initiative, or TAFI, tracked the activities of Chinese Embassies since October 2025, finding more than 30 cases where ambassadors promoted the five-year plan. \u201cThe frequency, similarity, and timing of output strongly imply MFA guidance,\u201d the report said, referring to China\u2019s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. \u201cVariance in message intensity, ideological depth, and host-country alignment claims tracks local conditions and individual ambassador style.\u201d The power of persuasion A key aspect of the campaign is how China is using persuasion rather than coercion to influence the Pacific countries to fall in line, Jonah Bock, TAFI\u2019s assistant director for research, who authored the report, told Radio Free Asia. Bock highlighted key examples where China attempted to directly persuade key government officials. In Vanuatu, Ambassador Li Minggang extolled the virtues of China\u2019s civil service oversight in a meeting with Ombudsman Hamilson Bulu and in Naoero, formerly Nauru, Ambassador Lyu Jin discussed judicial cooperation with Chief Justice Jay Udit. Chinese ambassador to Vanuatu Li Minggang in a meeting in Port Vila with Vanuatu's ombudsman Hamlison Bulu, March 3, 2026. (Chinese embassy in Vanuatu) \u201cAn ombudsman audits the government and a judiciary constrains it,\u201d he said. \u201cSo these are really helping shape how Pacific governments actually function in China\u2019s own model. And the importance of this is really normalization.\u201d Successfully persuading these countries to peacefully adopt a Chinese model is the goal of the campaign, he said. \u201cCoercion is expensive and it generates resistance. But persuasion does not. It\u2019s relatively cheap for China to do,\u201d Bock said. \u201cIf they can get these countries already using China\u2019s development strategies, its models, then these officials will start to think like China and be more willing of their own ideas to cooperate with China.\u201d Selling alignment The TAFI report said that throughout the campaign, ambassadors focused on three topics when explaining why aligning with the five-year plan would benefit their host countries: green development, economic openness, and shared prosperity. In Fiji, the Federated States of Micronesia, or FSM, and Tonga, the embassies pushed out messaging that touted China\u2019s concern for the environment, saying Beijing had \u201ccontributed one-quarter of the world\u2019s new green area\u201d and built the \u201cworld\u2019s largest clean power generation system.\u201d \u201cBeijing tailored this message for climate-conscious Pacific audiences, with the FSM embassy noting that \u2018green development has become a defining feature of contemporary China, where skies are bluer, waters are clearer, and lands are cleaner,\u2019\u201d the report said. Solar panels and wind turbines at a renewable energy farm in Lingwu, in China's northern Ningxia region, Dec. 22, 2025 (AFP) In Fiji and Papua New Guinea, or PNG, messaging also \u201cchampioned\u201d anti-protectionism, the report said. \u201cThe Fiji embassy noted that China has \u2018lifted all foreign investment restrictions in the manufacturing sector,\u2019 and the PNG embassy opined that \u2018while unilateralism and protectionism are on the rise\u2026 China remains firmly committed to opening up.\u2019\u201d Messaging also focused on poverty alleviation and personal income increasing as a result of rapid economic growth, according to the report. In FSM, Ambassador Wu Wei\u2019s op-ed said that due to China\u2019s robust education and security systems, the \u201cpeople\u2019s sense of gain, happiness, and security have been significantly enhanced.\u201d \u201cThe themes Chinese ambassadors chose to emphasize \u2026 are not incidental,\u201d the report said. \u201cEach topic serves one or more of Beijing\u2019s broader strategic objectives in the region, functioning simultaneously as a pitch for deeper cooperation, a contrast with Western alternatives, and a legitimization of the CCP\u2019s political model.\u201d Solidifying counter strategies If China were to achieve all its objectives in the Pacific, the region would be hostile to the United States and the interests of Washington and its allies, especially Taiwan, Bock told RFA. \u201cWe would have no more countries that recognize Taiwan. At the end of the day, that really is China\u2019s first objective,\u201d he said. \u201cWe would also start to see more economic dependencies, countries whose economic lifelines rely on China, which helps China again deepen their own influence.\u201d Jonah Bock, TAFI's assistant director for research, interviewed by Eugene Whong at Radio Free Asia's offices in Washington, Aug. 13, 2026 (RFA Video) He said adoption of China\u2019s governance models would sow the seeds of authoritarianism in the region. But the report outlined recommendations for the United States to counter the campaign. It identified FSM, the Marshall Islands, Palau and PNG as a \u201cstrategic core\u201d due to their \u201cdefense access and second-island-chain positioning\u201d and suggested that efforts to shore up relationships with this core should take priority over symmetrical levels of engagement with the whole region. It also suggested that Washington contest the same institutional grounds through judicial exchanges, legal-sector training, and civil service partnerships, noting that they \u201ccost a fraction of infrastructure competition and defend exactly the ground now under cultivation.\u201d TAFI also recommended helping Pacific governments in areas that they are already requesting, and to use private capital in circumstances where government aid moves too slowly. \u201cThese are things that are \u2026 already happening,\u201d Bock told RFA. \u201cFor instance, for the Solomon Islands \u2026 five staff in their parliament just went to D.C. for a program, with the U.S. Congress on legislative processes.\u201d He said this was the type of exchange that the report recommends and that he would like to see more of these. Additionally the report said that Washington could simply highlight Chinese actions in the Pacific to discredit Beijing\u2019s claims of non-interference in the internal matters of other countries, a key part of China\u2019s foreign policy that it often often invokes when deflecting criticism of its domestic policies. \u201cBeijing\u2019s non-interference claim is falsifiable, and PRC embassies have falsified it in their own published material,\u201d the report said. \u201cThe United States does not need to argue this case. It needs to document it and let Pacific audiences draw conclusions.\u201d Edited by Charlie Dharapak.","title":"China \u2018likely\u2019 ran targeted campaign to align Pacific with its latest five-year plan","topic":"Pacific","translation_language":"","url":"https://rfa.org/english/pacific/2026/08/20/china-pacific-five-year-plan-tafi/","video_url":null},{"article_body_paragraphs":[],"audio_source_url":null,"author":"Taejun Kang for RFA","available_dubs":[],"downloadable_assets":["https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/PB26GUT7JNHJTOMAY3G27UVNWY.jpg?auth=0c63704ad664ade4bb391142c38a2167020059fdc4a82954b652dbb1fadc46a2&smart=true&width=1500"],"duration_display":"0:00","duration_seconds":null,"embed_url":null,"id":7012,"image_caption":"A teacher talks to students as classes open for the new school year at an elementary school in Manila on June 8, 2026.","image_url":"https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/PB26GUT7JNHJTOMAY3G27UVNWY.jpg?auth=0c63704ad664ade4bb391142c38a2167020059fdc4a82954b652dbb1fadc46a2&smart=true&width=1500","is_clip":false,"item_type":"article","item_type_label":"Article","language_label":"English","media_credit":"Taejun Kang for RFA","micro_label":"Photo","micro_label_kind":"gallery","network_label":"RFA","network_logo_url":"/static/uploads/direct_network_logos/rfa_ca00144ac549.png","published_at":"2026-08-19T21:08:37","published_at_display":"19 Aug 2026, 21:08 GMT","sequence_badge_label":null,"sequence_count":null,"sequence_count_label":null,"sequence_frames":[],"sequence_kind":null,"source_name":"rfa_english_rss","source_name_label":"RFA English RSS","source_type":"rss","summary":"A bill that would integrate the Philippines\u2019 South China Sea territorial claims into school curricula could further integrate the issue into national identity and strengthen public support, experts told Radio Free Asia. Philippine lawmakers this month filed a measure seeking to institutionalize education about what Manila calls the West Philippine Sea \u2013 the parts of the South China Sea that fall within its exclusive economic zone. The sea is a major flashpoint in regional geopolitics. China uses a nine-dash line drawn on the map to delineate the entirety of the sea as its own territory, but parts of it are also claimed by the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei and Malaysia. The proposed West Philippine Sea Education Act would establish an education and awareness program covering basic and higher education. Lessons would use examples from international law to support Manila\u2019s claims, including a section on the 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague, which said that China\u2019s nine-dash line had no legal basis. Popular support is critical for Manila to pursue its claims, Jason Ng Sze Chieh, a lecturer at INTI International College Subang in Malaysia, told RFA. The claims \u201cmust be grounded in tangible, convincing, and easily digestible arguments formed around reasonings \u2026 that excite the public imagination,\u201d he said. \u201cOnce it catches the public\u2019s imagination, it is very difficult to redirect or scrub it from the collective mind.\u201d The overlapping claims of China and the Philippines in the South China Sea. (AFP) The proposal comes as Philippine authorities increasingly describe their confrontation with Beijing not only as a contest over ships and maritime access, but also over information and public perceptions. Lawmakers behind the House measure said students should be equipped against misinformation and propaganda about the country\u2019s maritime rights. From public awareness to strategy If signed into law, the bill would formalize a campaign that has already been moving into Philippine schools and other youth-oriented spaces. The Department of Education\u2019s regional offices have begun integrating West Philippine Sea topics into social studies curricula, while government agencies have held engagements with teachers and students. Earlier this year, Manila also expanded efforts to produce child-focused material about the disputed waters. In January 2025, Philippine agencies launched a 40-page comic book explaining maritime zones and international law. National Security Adviser Eduardo A\u00f1o said it complemented government efforts to counter what Manila called distorted Chinese narratives, while the Chinese Embassy accused the Philippines of \u201cpolitical manipulation.\u201d National Security Adviser Eduardo A\u00f1o and Philippine Coast Guard Spokesperson for the South China Sea Jay Tarriela stand next to a giant copy of the book \"The Stories of Teacher Jun\" during its launch at the National Library of the Philippines in Manila, Jan. 24, 2025. (Lisa Marie David/Reuters) Ng said using education as soft power could reinforce the Philippines\u2019 claim without resorting to confrontation with China. \u201cIt is the right move for the Philippines, which wishes to resolve this issue without resorting to violence,\u201d he said. \u201cSoft power, through education, can reinforce its claim and strengthen the government\u2019s resolve to push back against China\u2019s claim.\u201d The approach also reflects how governments across the region have used historical narratives to sustain their respective South China Sea positions. In Vietnam, authorities have directed schools to include material asserting Vietnamese sovereignty over Ho\u00e0ng Sa, the Paracel Islands, and Tr\u01b0\u1eddng Sa, the Spratly Islands, island groups that are also claimed entirely by China and Taiwan and partly by the other South China Sea claimants. Chinese educational material has also presented disputed features through Beijing\u2019s sovereignty narrative. A 2017 New Yorker report examined a primary-school Mandarin lesson about the Xisha Islands, China\u2019s name for the Paracels, that described the islands as part of China without discussing Vietnam\u2019s competing claim. Taiwan offers a different lesson Taiwan on paper continues to claim all territory previously claimed during the era when the Republic of China controlled the mainland, but Taipei\u2019s post-1990s shift toward a more Taiwan-centered educational framework gradually weakened the domestic prominence of its older South China Sea claims. This offers a contrast to Manila\u2019s current direction, Jozef Huljak, a Ph.D candidate in political science at Constantine the Philosopher University in Slovakia, whose research examines Taiwan\u2019s cultural and public diplomacy, told RFA. Taiwanese fishermen display flags and placards before departing to Taiping island, part of the disputed Spratly Islands chain in the South China Sea, at a fishing harbour in southern Pingtung on July 20, 2016. (The office of Kuomintang lawmaker Johnny Chiang/AFP) \u201cThe lesson is not that education determines territorial attitudes on its own,\u201d he said. \u201cIt is that education helps turn a legal claim into something the public understands as its own. Without that process, a claim can remain legally alive while becoming politically inert.\u201d Taiwan continues to control Taiping Island, the largest naturally formed feature in the Spratlys, but the South China Sea has comparatively little prominence in contemporary Taiwanese politics, Huljak said. That experience also points to a potential cost for Manila. \u201cOnce a claim is taught to children as a matter of national dignity, future governments may find it harder to negotiate fishing arrangements, provisional agreements or other compromises without appearing to retreat from something the state itself taught as national territory,\u201d Huljak said. For the Philippines, that may be precisely part of the appeal in the short term: ensuring that its South China Sea position survives changes of government and remains backed by voters long after the current confrontations at sea have passed. Teaching the dispute in classrooms may therefore do more than explain where the Philippines says its maritime rights begin and end, Ng said. It could help determine how politically negotiable those rights become for governments years from now. \u201cBefore a shot is fired, if one side wins the war of public perception, then the struggle is half won,\u201d he said. Edited by Eugene Whong.","title":"Philippines bets on classrooms to strengthen South China Sea claims","topic":"South China Sea","translation_language":"","url":"https://rfa.org/english/southchinasea/2026/08/19/philippines-south-china-sea-education/","video_url":null},{"article_body_paragraphs":[],"audio_source_url":null,"author":"Noh Jung Min for RFA, and Dickey Kundol, Tawang, and RFA Staff for RFA Tibetan","available_dubs":[],"downloadable_assets":["https://d3ayjbmlrrjm3o.cloudfront.net/wp-radiofreeasia/20260824/6a8cb18ddfad8f23e7f8af52/t_d4829d4ef3ab407980a256f2b934c6bc_name__Tibet__China_s_demolition_at_Larung_Gar_expands_Final/file_540x960-1600-v4.mp4","https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/5NDZRMSV6ZAAPKSFVGH6DXWL2I.png?auth=873cbde3e6456c2fbffe28e1075490ed3ad6f8c3a8113e13521e94d346e9c29d&smart=true&width=1500"],"duration_display":"0:00","duration_seconds":null,"embed_url":null,"id":11319,"image_caption":"An Aug. 11, 2026, photo shows demolition of monastic quarters  in progress by local authorities at Larung Gar Monastery.","image_url":"https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/5NDZRMSV6ZAAPKSFVGH6DXWL2I.png?auth=873cbde3e6456c2fbffe28e1075490ed3ad6f8c3a8113e13521e94d346e9c29d&smart=true&width=1500","is_clip":true,"item_type":"video","item_type_label":"Video","language_label":"English","media_credit":"Noh Jung Min for RFA, and Dickey Kundol, Tawang, and RFA Staff for RFA Tibetan","micro_label":"Video report","micro_label_kind":"video","network_label":"RFA","network_logo_url":"/static/uploads/direct_network_logos/rfa_ca00144ac549.png","published_at":"2026-08-19T03:01:35","published_at_display":"19 Aug 2026, 03:01 GMT","sequence_badge_label":null,"sequence_count":null,"sequence_count_label":null,"sequence_frames":[],"sequence_kind":null,"source_name":"rfa_english_rss","source_name_label":"RFA English RSS","source_type":"rss","summary":"Advocates say China razes monks\u2019 homes to restrict religious freedom and further ethnic unity law\u2019s reach in Tibet.","title":"Beijing resumes demolition of major Tibetan Buddhist academy, satellite imagery shows","topic":"Tibet","translation_language":"","url":"https://rfa.org/english/tibet/2026/08/19/larung-gar-china-demolition-buddhist-monks/","video_url":"https://d3ayjbmlrrjm3o.cloudfront.net/wp-radiofreeasia/20260824/6a8cb18ddfad8f23e7f8af52/t_d4829d4ef3ab407980a256f2b934c6bc_name__Tibet__China_s_demolition_at_Larung_Gar_expands_Final/file_540x960-1600-v4.mp4"},{"article_body_paragraphs":[],"audio_source_url":null,"author":"Noh Jung Min for RFA, and Dickey Kundol, Tawang, and RFA Staff for RFA Tibetan","available_dubs":[],"downloadable_assets":["https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/5NDZRMSV6ZAAPKSFVGH6DXWL2I.png?auth=873cbde3e6456c2fbffe28e1075490ed3ad6f8c3a8113e13521e94d346e9c29d&smart=true&width=1500"],"duration_display":"0:00","duration_seconds":null,"embed_url":null,"id":6672,"image_caption":"An Aug. 11, 2026, photo shows demolition of monastic quarters  in progress by local authorities at Larung Gar Monastery.","image_url":"https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/5NDZRMSV6ZAAPKSFVGH6DXWL2I.png?auth=873cbde3e6456c2fbffe28e1075490ed3ad6f8c3a8113e13521e94d346e9c29d&smart=true&width=1500","is_clip":false,"item_type":"article","item_type_label":"Article","language_label":"English","media_credit":"Noh Jung Min for RFA, and Dickey Kundol, Tawang, and RFA Staff for RFA Tibetan","micro_label":"Photo","micro_label_kind":"gallery","network_label":"RFA","network_logo_url":"/static/uploads/direct_network_logos/rfa_ca00144ac549.png","published_at":"2026-08-19T03:01:35","published_at_display":"19 Aug 2026, 03:01 GMT","sequence_badge_label":null,"sequence_count":null,"sequence_count_label":null,"sequence_frames":[],"sequence_kind":null,"source_name":"rfa_english_rss","source_name_label":"RFA English RSS","source_type":"rss","summary":"Chinese authorities in Tibet have over the past month continued and expanded demolition of the Larung Gar Buddhist Academy , satellite imagery analyzed by Radio Free Asia shows. It is the latest in a series of moves by Beijing to downsize the major center of Tibetan Buddhist learning which at its peak in the early 2000s was home to 40,000 Buddhist monastics. Last year, Chinese authorities expelled thousands of Tibetan monks and nuns from Larung Gar, which is in Serthar county (Seda in Chinese) within the Kardze (Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture of Sichuan province. Sources at the time said that thousands of homes had been marked for demolition. The demolitions have been carried out in separate phases since 2001, according to the Central Tibetan Administration, or CTA, the official government-in-exile located in Dharamsala, India. This time, at least 1,060 residences belonging to monks and nuns are targeted for demolition, which appears to have begun around July 13, Tenzin Pema, director of strategic communication at the Washington-based International Campaign for Tibet, or ICT, and formerly RFA Tibetan director, told RFA. \u201cRFA\u2019s August 14 imagery appears to show clearance spreading around the academy\u2019s central area, supporting our July 17 report that a new demolition campaign began around July 13,\u201d Pema said. \u201cThe current campaign raises fears of another major assault on Tibetan Buddhist religious, cultural, and educational life.\u201d ICT is concerned that this latest round of demolitions at one of the largest Tibetan Buddhist centers in the world represents a further tightening of restrictions on religious practice, Pema said. Cultural nexus Established in 1980 to revive Buddhist scholarship, Larung Gar has grown into one of the world\u2019s largest centers for Tibetan Buddhist learning. Over the decades, it became one of the most influential centers for the study of Tibetan language, culture, and religion, attracting thousands of Chinese Buddhist practitioners, in addition to Tibetans. The current phase of demolition follows an earlier one about a decade ago, where Chinese authorities destroyed half the compound and sent away thousands of monks and nuns, over what authorities said were overcrowding and fire-safety concerns. Rights groups , however, have said that the demolitions are part of Beijing\u2019s attempt to exert control over religious and educational institutions. Comparing satellite imagery from July 24 and August 14 shows that the demolition area has expanded and that some areas have been cleared of debris. Dump trucks and excavators can still be seen operating at the approximately 2.5-acre (1 hectare) demolition site. (RFA) Satellite imagery captured Aug. 14 confirms that approximately 2.5 acres (1 hectare) has been cleared from a residential area of the academy since demolition started. Dump trucks and excavators remain visible at the site, and demolition is scheduled to be completed by Aug. 20, according to RFA sources familiar with the situation on the ground in Serthar. According to ICT, Larung Gar has been reduced to about half its size through the demolition of dwellings over the years. In 2016 and 2017, about 5,000 monks and nuns were evicted from the academy and nearly 5,000 dwellings were demolished, Pema said. Sources told RFA that last year, after some monks and nuns were expelled from Larung Gar, a number of residences were left vacant. This year, however, some of the residences are reportedly being demolished without public notice. There are also reportedly plans to continue demolishing additional residences next year. A photo received by RFA Tibetan on Aug. 11, 2026, shows demolition work at night at Larung Gar. (Citizen Photo via RFA) Prior to the current round of demolitions, Chinese authorities intensified restrictions at Larung Gar, limiting the number of monks and nuns at the religious institute and expelling some of them, RFA Tibetan reported. The number expelled has not been confirmed, but demolition began in residences that had been vacated under these restrictions. In apparent protest of the demolitions, a monk reportedly displayed a large portrait of the 10th Panchen Lama, from a window of one of the residences. The Panchen Lama is the second most important figure in Tibetan Buddhism after the Dalai Lama. After the 1989 death of the 10th Panchen Lama, the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government spent the next six years looking for his successor, with each appointing a different person . The 10th Panchen Lama is therefore the last person to hold the position to have been recognized by both the Chinese government and Tibetans. Some sources familiar with the situation in Larung Gar told RFA that it remains unclear whether the monk who hung the portrait has been detained by Chinese authorities. Other sources said that the monk has disappeared and his whereabouts are unknown. Tight restrictions on communication between the area and the outside world have prevented confirmation of details, including the monk\u2019s name. A map shows the location of Larung Gar. (ICT) The Chinese government\u2019s demolition of monks\u2019 residences at Larung Gar is a \u201cserious situation\u201d that demands global attention, Tenzin Lekshay, spokesperson for the CTA, told RFA. \u201cDespite China\u2019s widespread claims and propaganda that religious freedom exists in Tibet, the actual situation on the ground clearly demonstrates a lack of religious freedom,\u201d Lekshay said. \u201cThe international community must directly protest against the Chinese government.\u201d Increased Surveillance Concurrent with the demolitions, local level authorities have placed restrictions on the number of tourists allowed to visit Larung Gar and limited movement within the academy\u2019s grounds. In a notice issued July 11, Serthar County tourism authorities said road maintenance work leading to Larung Gar would begin on July 13, and that the operating hours of public buses traveling to the site would be temporarily changed. The Serthar County Public Security Bureau also reminded tourists that they must only travel to Larung Gar via official arrangements and are prohibited from entering on their own. Authorities also warned visitors not to trust information provided by people with no connection to the local area and prohibited individuals from bypassing restricted areas or crossing mountains to enter the site independently, according to information obtained by RFA Tibetan. Visitors are reportedly allowed to remain for no more than 90 minutes and must travel on designated shuttle buses. They are also required to rent a small electronic tracking device for 200 yuan ($29). According to sources, the device is used to monitor visitors\u2019 movements, enforce time limits and restrict access to certain areas. People with contacts inside Tibet told RFA that telephone conversations with individuals in and around Larung Gar are believed to be closely monitored by Chinese security authorities, making residents reluctant to speak openly. Sources also said local people are increasingly afraid to answer questions directly about conditions at Larung Gar, adding that this level of surveillance is no longer unique to the area but has become common across many parts of Tibet. Forced unity ICT emphasized that these developments must be viewed against the backdrop of Larung Gar\u2019s recent history and in the context of China\u2019s new Ethnic Unity and Progress Law . The latest demolitions come after China implemented the law, which focuses on reshaping ethnic identity, changing the legal framework around language, expanding state oversight of religion, and extending the law\u2019s reach beyond China\u2019s border. \u201cIt is especially concerning that the demolitions began just weeks after the new law came into effect on July 1,\u201d Pema said. \u201cThe law codifies broader coercive assimilation policies aimed at erasing Tibetan identity and threatens the future of key centers of Buddhist learning and practice such as Larung Gar.\u201d Edited by Eugene Whong.","title":"Beijing resumes demolition of major Tibetan Buddhist academy, satellite imagery shows","topic":"Tibet","translation_language":"","url":"https://rfa.org/english/tibet/2026/08/19/larung-gar-china-demolition-buddhist-monks/","video_url":null},{"article_body_paragraphs":[],"audio_source_url":null,"author":"Jason Gutierrez for RFA","available_dubs":[],"downloadable_assets":["https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/OWURW2ZBZND7RNWDSUETPYFQJ4.JPG?auth=9c787a5f2a4dfd94de1c91661c5e586ee723ed6ed9dd63733ed75b4b22fb8a90&smart=true&width=1500"],"duration_display":"0:00","duration_seconds":null,"embed_url":null,"id":6266,"image_caption":"Workers inspect power devices at a Philippines-based semiconductor manufacturing plant in Manila Dec. 10, 2008.","image_url":"https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/OWURW2ZBZND7RNWDSUETPYFQJ4.JPG?auth=9c787a5f2a4dfd94de1c91661c5e586ee723ed6ed9dd63733ed75b4b22fb8a90&smart=true&width=1500","is_clip":false,"item_type":"article","item_type_label":"Article","language_label":"English","media_credit":"Jason Gutierrez for RFA","micro_label":"Photo","micro_label_kind":"gallery","network_label":"RFA","network_logo_url":"/static/uploads/direct_network_logos/rfa_ca00144ac549.png","published_at":"2026-08-18T01:40:52","published_at_display":"18 Aug 2026, 01:40 GMT","sequence_badge_label":null,"sequence_count":null,"sequence_count_label":null,"sequence_frames":[],"sequence_kind":null,"source_name":"rfa_english_rss","source_name_label":"RFA English RSS","source_type":"rss","summary":"Updated on Aug. 18, 2026 at 11:49 a.m. ET MANILA, Philippines \u2013 A U.S. plan to build a critical technology hub in the Philippines is a symbolic return to the site of one of its largest overseas former bases, experts in the country told Radio Free Asia. The hub will be part of the U.S.-led Pax Silica initiative, aimed at shoring up supply chains for semiconductors, AI and rare earth elements. It will be built in New Clark City, north of Manila, on land that was part of a U.S. military reservation complex that included Clark Air Base, until the Philippines voted to take control of it in 1991. Supporters of the plan tout its potential economic benefits \u2013 the project will create around 200,000 jobs and up to US$70 billion in investment \u2013 but critics say that the plan is cedes too much control to Washington, and could be potentially harmful to the environment. Either way, the historical significance of a major U.S. project on the grounds of the former base is not lost on observers. \u201cI see the symbolic value of the U.S. returning to Clark,\u201d Chester Cabalza, founder of the Manila-based think tank International Development and Security Cooperation, told RFA. \u201cIt centers on an historic reversal of geopolitical fortunes, transforming a symbol of post-Cold War retreat into a modern monument of the ironclad U.S.-Philippine alliance.\u201d Passengers queue to enter the Diosdado Macapagal International airport, formerly Clark Air Base in Pampanga province north of Manila, March 26, 2008. Other parts of the former U.S. Air Base and the associated military reserve are today part of New Clark City, a planned community that will feature a new technology hub. (Romeo Ranoco/Reuters) The battlefield has evolved since the Cold War era, but just as Clark Air Base was a key cog in the U.S.\u2019 Asian containment strategy of that era, the Pax Silica hub is intended to secure technology supply chains for Washington and its allies, even as China has launched its own global AI framework. Chinese President Xi Jinping in July launched the Shanghai-based World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization, or WAICO, promoting a Beijing-led AI ecosystem and analysts say that Washington may soon ask countries to choose Pax Silica over Xi\u2019s group. \u2018Purely Practical\u2019 Though analysts see a global tug of war between Beijing and Washington spilling over into the technology arena, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., while addressing a forum of the Foreign Correspondents Association of the Philippines Friday said that the Philippines\u2019 involvement in the plan is economic in nature and is \u201cpurely practical\u201d rather than political. The Philippines has territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea, which Beijing claims in its entirety, but which Manila claims in part. Marcos acknowledged the dispute, but said the Philippines\u2019 Pax Silica plans were more about fostering an economic partnership. \u201cAll of these\u2026conflicting claims in the West Philippine Sea simply did not enter into that discussion,\u201d he said, referring to the part of the sea that lies within Manila\u2019s exclusive economic zone. \u201cAnd so, the idea that we are somehow distancing ourselves from China is quite the contrary.\u201d Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. addresses the Foreign Correspondents Association of the Philippines in Manila, Aug. 14, 2026. (Jason Gutierrez/RFA) Manila, he said, was open to investment opportunities from anyone interested \u201cas long as it is to the mutual benefit of all parties involved\u201d and will grab the opportunity \u201cno matter where it comes from.\u201d \u201cAs long as we are able to move the economy forward and to better the lives of our people, then that is something that we will certainly examine,\u201d Marcos stressed. \u201cAnd if it turns out that this is a beneficial agreement or arrangement, then certainly we will become part of it.\u201d Though the tech hub will create jobs, it will facilitate the entry into the Philippines of U.S. military personnel and compromise its sovereignty, Teddy Casino, leader of the nationalist Bayan group that has been protesting Pax Silica, told RFA. \u201cThe promise of economic development under U.S. patronage is the same deception that U.S. imperialism has been peddling in the past 128 years of its colonial and neocolonial rule in the Philippines,\u201d he said. \u201cUnder Pax Silica, Filipinos are once again being told the lie that surrendering greater economic and strategic space to the US is synonymous with development.\u201d People march as they protest against Pax Silica, a U.S.-led initiative, in Manila on August 13, 2026. (Jam Sta Rosa/AFP) Raffy Tulfo of the Philippines Senate, who heads the committee on the environment has filed a resolution seeking to investigate the project to determine its economic, environmental, social, technological, and national security implications. Tulfo said there were many legitimate concerns about the project, despite its touted benefits. \u201cWhile such investments may contribute significantly to economic growth, technology transfer, innovation, and job creation, they have likewise generated public concerns and policy questions,\u201d he said in his resolution. Among the concerns raised in the resolution are land use and urban planning, water consumption, resource allocation, and environmental sustainability, as well as the project\u2019s potential impact on the rights, welfare, cultural integrity, and ancestral domains of indigenous peoples and local communities. But the benefits outweigh the risks, Cabalza said. \u201cThis strategic investment, when wisely planned, will bring an influx of financing infrastructure and economic defense in the digital supply chain,\u201d he said, But he acknowledged that the Philippines\u2019 participation in Pax Silica could provoke China to retaliate with economic pressure. \u201cFor China, with the advent of the US-led AI investment through the Pax Silica, the more they will tighten their economic and security grip in the Philippines,\u201d he said, pointing out that one of the measures Beijing may employ is restricting Philippine agricultural and raw materials exports. Defense vs. malign influence More than anything, the Washington-designed Pax Silica is seen as a defense against malign Chinese influence, Vincent Kyle Parada, a defense analyst at the De La Salle-College of Saint Benilde in Manila, told RFA. \u201cDealing with Chinese firms is simply too big of a risk for Manila. Beijing\u2019s reach extends far,\u201d he said. \u201cThat\u2019s really why the US introduced Pax Silica to begin with. The distinction between economics and security is fast disintegrating, and Washington needs to secure its supply chains from any form of malign interference.\u201d A Filipino manufacturing operator is reflected on an Automatic Mould machine at a Philippine-based semiconductor manufacturing plant in Manila Sept. 20, 2005. (Cheryl Ravelo/Reuters) The proposed Philippines Pax Silica hub is part of Washington\u2019s \u201cfriend-shoring\u201d strategy \u2013 transferring production to \u201cfriendly\u201d countries in order to mitigate risks, he said. \u201cManila is Washington\u2019s only treaty ally in Southeast Asia. It is not a part of the China-led WAICO and is, therefore, not as deeply embedded into China\u2019s AI and semiconductor supply chain compared to its neighbors,\u201d Parada said. \u201cThat makes it the perfect candidate for Pax Silica, while at the same time, benefitting Manila by providing Washington more skin in the game in its continued commitment to the US-Philippine alliance.\u201d The Philippines participation is an expression of its own strategic autonomy, Arnaud Leveau, president of the Paris-based Asia Center, told RFA. He said that while the Philippines needed to diversify some of its dependencies, including in areas such as semiconductors, \u201cit should not mean exchanging dependence on China for excessive dependence on another external partner.\u201d \u201cThe central issue, in my view, is whether the Philippines can use this initiative to strengthen its own technological and industrial sovereignty rather than simply becoming a geographical platform within somebody else\u2019s supply chain,\u201d said Leveau, who also teaches at the Paris Dauphine University. But he warned that a complete technological or economic disengagement from China would be extremely difficult and probably undesirable. \u201cChina is not simply a geopolitical competitor. It is also one of the world\u2019s major industrial and technological ecosystems,\u201d Leveau stressed. \u201cChinese companies are increasingly important in AI, batteries, electric vehicles, telecommunications, renewable energy and advanced manufacturing.\u201d Edited by Eugene Whong. Update adds comments from Casino and details about Senate resolution.","title":"Proposed US-led tech hub in the Philippines will secure supply chains, create jobs","topic":"South China Sea","translation_language":"","url":"https://rfa.org/english/southchinasea/2026/08/18/pax-silica-philippines-us-clark/","video_url":null},{"article_body_paragraphs":[],"audio_source_url":null,"author":"RFA Staff","available_dubs":[],"downloadable_assets":["https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/RLRGZEX2NBD75BFDRBINBI7BQY.JPG?auth=659db980a19e7add4d37a2a87dcac1692bb940d37d6b49d672272c31f1b989c2&smart=true&width=1500"],"duration_display":"0:00","duration_seconds":null,"embed_url":null,"id":4596,"image_caption":"A March 6, 2002, photo of Chinese President Jiang Zemin, left, and Premier Zhu Rongji at the National People's Congress (NPC) in Beijing.","image_url":"https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/RLRGZEX2NBD75BFDRBINBI7BQY.JPG?auth=659db980a19e7add4d37a2a87dcac1692bb940d37d6b49d672272c31f1b989c2&smart=true&width=1500","is_clip":false,"item_type":"article","item_type_label":"Article","language_label":"English","media_credit":"RFA Staff","micro_label":"Photo","micro_label_kind":"gallery","network_label":"RFA","network_logo_url":"/static/uploads/direct_network_logos/rfa_ca00144ac549.png","published_at":"2026-08-12T21:48:20","published_at_display":"12 Aug 2026, 21:48 GMT","sequence_badge_label":null,"sequence_count":null,"sequence_count_label":null,"sequence_frames":[],"sequence_kind":null,"source_name":"rfa_english_rss","source_name_label":"RFA English RSS","source_type":"rss","summary":"The late former premier of China Zhu Rongji wielded the economic hammer during China\u2019s rapid economic rise in the 1990s and 2000s to increase Beijing\u2019s influence over Tibet, an expert told Radio Free Asia shortly after Zhu\u2019s death on Wednesday. Zhu, 98, died at 11:06 a.m. in Beijing of an unspecified illness, the state-run Xinhua News Agency reported. As premier alongside President Jiang Zemin from 1998 to 2003, Zhu had spearheaded China\u2019s accession to the World Trade Organization and ushered in an era of rapid economic growth and full integration into the global market through a series of bold but not fully completed reforms. The pair are credited with orchestrating China\u2019s gradual escape from international isolation following the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown and its path to becoming the world\u2019s second-largest economy. But for Tibetans, Zhu\u2019s legacy as an architect of China\u2019s economic rise is one of increasing Beijing\u2019s political control over the region, Buchung Tsering, research director at the Washington-based International Campaign for Tibet, told RFA. \u201c As part of the Western Development Strategy, Zhu promoted greater economic development in Tibetan areas, seeking to use economic means to maintain \u2018stability\u2019 in Tibet and bring Tibetans in line with the Chinese government\u2019s policies,\u201d Tsering said. \u201cZhu Rongji can therefore be seen as a key figure in strengthening Beijing\u2019s political control over Tibet through economic means.\u201d A Chinese student supporting Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji is knocked to the ground by protesters supporting Tibetan and Taiwanese independence, April 14, 1999 at MIT in Cambridge, Massachusetts. (Jim Bourg/Reuters) The Western Development Strategy was a state-run economic development program that included large scale infrastructure projects intended to integrate China\u2019s western frontier, including Tibet and the Uyghur region, with its booming coastal cities. Critics have said that this policy accelerated the westward migration of the Han population, objectively altering the local population structure and triggering discontent among local ethnic minorities regarding the marginalization of their native culture and the unfair distribution of economic benefits. Overseas Tibetans and Uyghurs have protested this issue on numerous occasions. A Tibetan demonstrator displays a Tibetan flag as they protest Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji near the Chinese embassy in New Delhi, Jan. 15, 2002. (Prakash Singh/AFP) The Western Development Strategy is widely considered to be the blueprint for the Belt and Road Initiative, which is similarly criticized as a means for China to increase its influence, though on a global, rather than national scale. Progress and setbacks Zhu Rongji\u2019s forceful reforms of the overall Chinese economy were accompanied by social pain, including the layoffs of tens of millions of state workers, and the subsequent increased financial pressure on local governments following the 1994 tax-sharing reform. Because the social security system was not yet fully developed at the time, workers suddenly lost their medical, housing, and pension guarantees, triggering massive layoffs and local labor protests, all of which were subsequently suppressed by the government. In addition, during his tenure, the Chinese government launched a severe crackdown on the Falun Gong religious group in 1999, and arrested and sentenced political dissidents and NGOs who attempted to form the \u201cChina Democracy Party.\u201d A screen shows a portrait of former Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji who passed away on Wednesday, in Beijing, China, Aug. 12, 2026. (Maxim Shemetov/Reuters) After stepping down in 2003, Zhu Rongji rarely made public appearances, but continued to maintain ties with his alma mater, Tsinghua University. He served as the first dean of Tsinghua University\u2019s School of Economics and Management from 1984 to 2001, a term that lasted 17 years. Since the Xi Jinping era began, many reforms implemented in the 1990s under Zhu\u2019s tenure have been reversed. The Xi Jinping government has vigorously supported state-owned enterprises while suppressing private enterprises and technology companies. Life and career Zhu Rongji was born in Changsha, Hunan Province, in 1928. He graduated from Tsinghua University in Beijing with a degree in electronic engineering. He joined the Communist Party of China in 1949, the same year that Mao Zedong, another native of Changsha, announced the founding of the People\u2019s Republic of China. Zhu Rongji holds a tea leaf during his visit to the Maramba Tea Estate in Limuru, west of Nairobi, Kenya, April 26, 2002. (Pedro Ugarte/AFP) During the political movements of the Mao Zedong era, Zhu Rongji was purged twice. During the Anti-Rightist Campaign in 1958, he was labeled a \u201cRightist\u201d and expelled from the Party. During the Cultural Revolution, he was again persecuted, and from 1970 to 1975, he was sent to a \u201cMay Seventh Cadre School\u201d for labor \u201cre-education.\u201d During the tenure of Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji, the Chinese government was recognized for maintaining economic and RMB exchange rate stability during the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Compared to the period under Xi Jinping, the Jiang-Zhu era is also seen by some reformists and observers as a relatively open and optimistic time. Jiang Zemin passed away in November 2022 at the age of 96. However, China\u2019s economic marketization at that time did not bring about corresponding political liberalization. Edited by Eugene Whong from a report by RFA Mandarin . Additional reporting by Tsetan Dolkar and editing by Tawang for RFA Tibetan.","title":"Late former premier Zhu Rongji used economics to tighten China\u2019s grip on Tibet","topic":"Tibet","translation_language":"","url":"https://rfa.org/english/tibet/2026/08/12/china-zhu-rongji-obituary-tibet-influence/","video_url":null},{"article_body_paragraphs":[],"audio_source_url":null,"author":"Taejun Kang for RFA","available_dubs":[],"downloadable_assets":["https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/LKNAG77BFBH2BCH3JWRXT3U2IM.JPG?auth=b3690353f1189105b7dd90d56ab431d3280c2cc9f4d9a3595a3974ac8c662b51&smart=true&width=1500"],"duration_display":"0:00","duration_seconds":null,"embed_url":null,"id":3825,"image_caption":"Crew members stand aboard a Kuang Hua VI-class missile boat with a Taiwan flag in the background during the annual Han Kuang military exercises at a navy base in Kaohsiung, Taiwan, Aug. 8, 2026.","image_url":"https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/LKNAG77BFBH2BCH3JWRXT3U2IM.JPG?auth=b3690353f1189105b7dd90d56ab431d3280c2cc9f4d9a3595a3974ac8c662b51&smart=true&width=1500","is_clip":false,"item_type":"article","item_type_label":"Article","language_label":"English","media_credit":"Taejun Kang for RFA","micro_label":"Photo","micro_label_kind":"gallery","network_label":"RFA","network_logo_url":"/static/uploads/direct_network_logos/rfa_ca00144ac549.png","published_at":"2026-08-11T02:45:29","published_at_display":"11 Aug 2026, 02:45 GMT","sequence_badge_label":null,"sequence_count":null,"sequence_count_label":null,"sequence_frames":[],"sequence_kind":null,"source_name":"rfa_english_rss","source_name_label":"RFA English RSS","source_type":"rss","summary":"Taiwan is trapped between sea rocks and a hard place: As the Philippines has filed documentation to strengthen its claims in the South China Sea, Taipei must balance asserting its own conflicting claims with building closer ties with Manila, especially as a potential ally against Chinese aggression, experts told Radio Free Asia. The Philippines on July 29 submitted its official nautical chart of Scarborough Shoal, a disputed feature in what Manila calls the West Philippine Sea \u2013 the section of the South China Sea that is within its exclusive economic zone \u2013 to the United Nations, to bolster its claim on the area, which is also claimed by China and Taiwan. Beijing immediately protested the filing, accusing Manila of infringing on Chinese sovereignty. Taiwan also opposed the move, but in a way that did not outright condemn the Philippines. It also repeated its call for Taiwan to be included in negotiations over South China Sea disputes. \u201cThe filing adds specificity to a Philippine position that was already well established,\u201d Sylwia M. Gorska, a doctoral candidate in international relations at the University of Central Lancashire in the United Kingdom, told RFA. \u201cFor Taiwan, the consequence is not the loss of its claim, but a further deterioration in its relative ability to make that claim consequential.\u201d The overlapping claims of China and the Philippines in the South China Sea. (AFP) The episode highlights an increasingly awkward tension for President Lai Ching-te\u2019s government. That government considers itself to be the continuation of the Republic of China, or ROC, and thus continues to formally claim land it historically laid claim to, dating back to the era that it controlled the mainland, including Scarborough Shoal and other South China Sea features. Meanwhile, the Philippines has become an increasingly important security partner as both governments contend with pressure from Beijing. Official status Unlike Manila and Beijing, Taipei is excluded from the United Nations and has limited ability to advocate for its claims via the same international processes being used by other claimants. But Taiwan\u2019s exclusion from the U.N. system does not invalidate its claim, Aadil Brar, a Taipei-based independent analyst and former visiting scholar at National Chengchi University, told RFA. \u201cThe real problem is procedural rather than substantive,\u201d Brar told RFA. Taiwan can continue asserting sovereignty through Foreign Ministry statements and other diplomatic channels, he said, but cannot participate on equivalent terms in the international mechanisms through which Manila is formalizing its position. That disadvantage is compounded by Taiwan\u2019s lack of a physical role around Scarborough. Gorska noted that China has exercised de facto control around the shoal since 2012 and sharply increased its Coast Guard presence there, while Philippine Coast Guard and fisheries vessels continue to challenge Chinese restrictions. An Oct. 12, 2025, photo distributed by the Philippine Coast Guard shows a China coast guard ship, right, deploying a water cannon at a Philippine Bureau of Fisheries vessel near Thitu Island in disputed waters of the South China Sea. (Philippine Coast Guard via AFP) \u201cIn practice, Scarborough is now contested primarily by China and the Philippines,\u201d she said. \u201cThey are the states maintaining presence, generating the confrontations and forcing decisions about how far coercion can go before it carries wider diplomatic or alliance consequences.\u201d \u201cTaiwan remains a claimant, but it is largely absent from those day-to-day interactions and therefore has limited influence over the operational conditions around the shoal.\u201d Strategic restraint Taiwan\u2019s weak operational position gives Taipei little incentive to turn the Philippine filing into a serious bilateral dispute, analysts said. The Philippines\u2019 northern islands sit close to Taiwan and the Luzon Strait, a key maritime passage that could become strategically important in any cross-Strait conflict. The Philippines is also a U.S. treaty ally and has expanded military cooperation with Washington. Gorska pointed to the deployment of the U.S. NMESIS anti-ship missile system in Batanes during this year\u2019s Balikatan exercises as an example of the growing military relevance of the northern Philippines to Taiwan\u2019s security environment. \u201cA more forceful Taiwanese response would signal continued commitment to the ROC claim, but it would do little to improve Taipei\u2019s position at Scarborough and could impose costs on a relationship that may matter far more in a cross-Strait crisis,\u201d she said. It is for this reason that disputes between Manila and Taipei will likely be handled quietly, Enrico Cau, a Taipei-based independent security researcher, told RFA. \u201cUnder the current situation it is likely that most differences on disputes in the South China Sea between Taiwan and the Philippines will be ironed out through diplomatic channels and a carefully dosed media exposure, where disagreements are manifested with moderation,\u201d Cau said. Philippine military servicemen take part in a counter-landing live fire exercise during the annual US-Philippines joint military \"Balikatan\" exercise in Rizal, Palawan, Philippines, April 28, 2025. (Jam Sta Rosa/AFP) He said actions by the Philippines and other regional governments were primarily aimed at countering China rather than challenging Taiwan, giving Taipei an additional reason to exercise restraint. Brar similarly said Taiwan\u2019s response to Manila had been notably softer than the language it typically uses when responding to Chinese moves in disputed waters. \u201cTaiwan is almost certainly going to downplay this dispute, and its actual response already shows that,\u201d he said. Domestic politics In Taiwan, the restrained approach has become a hotly debated issue in the political arena. Chen I-hsin, Culture and Communications Committee Chair of the main opposition Kuomintang (KMT), accused the government of applying double standards, contrasting its muted reaction to the Philippine filing with its criticism last year of China\u2019s establishment of a nature reserve at Scarborough Shoal. Chen urged the Foreign Ministry to negotiate with Manila to defend Taiwan\u2019s sovereignty. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) lawmaker Wu Szu-yao pushed back, saying Taiwan and the Philippines were both victims of Chinese aggression and arguing that the KMT should instead direct its criticism at Chinese leader Xi Jinping. The dispute reflects a broader divergence over how much political weight Taiwan should give to historic South China Sea claims from the era that the ROC controlled the mainland. Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung acknowledged in July that Taiwan was not actively pressing its South China Sea claims, while maintaining that its formal sovereignty position had not changed. Gorska said that distinction was important. \u201cThe Lai administration appears to be reducing the political salience of the ROC\u2019s traditional South China Sea claims rather than abandoning them,\u201d she said. \u201cThe claims remain formally intact, but Taipei is no longer treating their public assertion as an objective in itself.\u201d A rally opposing a scaled-down defense budget passed by the legislature in Taipei on May 23, 2026. (I-hwa Cheng/AFP) Taiwan continues to administer Taiping Island, the largest naturally occurring feature in the Spratly Islands, and has reaffirmed its South China Sea claims when challenged. But analysts said Taipei appears increasingly selective about which claims warrant sustained political attention. Cau said there were signs within the DPP of a more pragmatic approach that placed greater emphasis on international law and on territory Taiwan could realistically control and defend. It remained unclear, he said, whether Lai\u2019s softer approach represented a genuine move away from traditional ROC claims or simply an attempt to navigate an increasingly complex regional security environment. For Taipei, that ambiguity may itself be useful, according to analysts. Taiwan can preserve its formal sovereignty position without allowing a remote shoal it does not control to disrupt a relationship with Manila that is becoming more consequential to its security. But the Philippine filing also points to a longer-term risk for Taiwan \u2013 if regional governments increasingly formalize maritime claims through U.N. filings or eventually reach agreements governing behavior in the South China Sea, Taiwan could find rules affecting its interests being shaped without its participation, Cau said. Edited by Eugene Whong.","title":"Taiwan soft-pedals Scarborough claim as Manila ties take priority","topic":"South China Sea","translation_language":"","url":"https://rfa.org/english/southchinasea/2026/08/11/taiwan-philippines-scarborough-shoal-filing/","video_url":null},{"article_body_paragraphs":[],"audio_source_url":null,"author":"Noh Jung Min for RFA","available_dubs":[],"downloadable_assets":["https://d3ayjbmlrrjm3o.cloudfront.net/wp-radiofreeasia/20260814/6a7f548f14053162143fc7f0/t_9c3c4233e6fb4130b8cc79f7a7d9f9c4_name__Laos__Pak_Beng_Dam_project___Final/file_540x960-1600-v4.mp4","https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/L6CKJ4VEXJH3FNK3FNLTT4B35E.png?auth=11ae872551c6b9c9843b125116154fa6e523b7fcf19bc60ba620746c0e7065e6&smart=true&width=1500"],"duration_display":"0:00","duration_seconds":null,"embed_url":null,"id":11324,"image_caption":"Slow boats line up to wait for passengers at the Pak Beng pier on the Mekong River in northern Laos' Oudomxay province, site of a proposed hydroelectric dam, in a file photo.","image_url":"https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/L6CKJ4VEXJH3FNK3FNLTT4B35E.png?auth=11ae872551c6b9c9843b125116154fa6e523b7fcf19bc60ba620746c0e7065e6&smart=true&width=1500","is_clip":true,"item_type":"video","item_type_label":"Video","language_label":"English","media_credit":"Noh Jung Min for RFA","micro_label":"Video report","micro_label_kind":"video","network_label":"RFA","network_logo_url":"/static/uploads/direct_network_logos/rfa_ca00144ac549.png","published_at":"2026-08-06T12:59:21","published_at_display":"6 Aug 2026, 12:59 GMT","sequence_badge_label":null,"sequence_count":null,"sequence_count_label":null,"sequence_frames":[],"sequence_kind":null,"source_name":"rfa_english_rss","source_name_label":"RFA English RSS","source_type":"rss","summary":"Experts say the Pak Beng dam and the many others like it put the livelihoods of local communities at risk.","title":"Satellite imagery shows work underway on Laos\u2019 latest large Mekong River dam","topic":"Laos","translation_language":"","url":"https://rfa.org/english/laos/2026/08/06/mekong-dam-pak-beng-construction/","video_url":"https://d3ayjbmlrrjm3o.cloudfront.net/wp-radiofreeasia/20260814/6a7f548f14053162143fc7f0/t_9c3c4233e6fb4130b8cc79f7a7d9f9c4_name__Laos__Pak_Beng_Dam_project___Final/file_540x960-1600-v4.mp4"},{"article_body_paragraphs":[],"audio_source_url":null,"author":"Noh Jung Min for RFA","available_dubs":[],"downloadable_assets":["https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/L6CKJ4VEXJH3FNK3FNLTT4B35E.png?auth=11ae872551c6b9c9843b125116154fa6e523b7fcf19bc60ba620746c0e7065e6&smart=true&width=1500"],"duration_display":"0:00","duration_seconds":null,"embed_url":null,"id":2361,"image_caption":"Slow boats line up to wait for passengers at the Pak Beng pier on the Mekong River in northern Laos' Oudomxay province, site of a proposed hydroelectric dam, in a file photo.","image_url":"https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/L6CKJ4VEXJH3FNK3FNLTT4B35E.png?auth=11ae872551c6b9c9843b125116154fa6e523b7fcf19bc60ba620746c0e7065e6&smart=true&width=1500","is_clip":false,"item_type":"article","item_type_label":"Article","language_label":"English","media_credit":"Noh Jung Min for RFA","micro_label":"Photo","micro_label_kind":"gallery","network_label":"RFA","network_logo_url":"/static/uploads/direct_network_logos/rfa_ca00144ac549.png","published_at":"2026-08-06T12:59:21","published_at_display":"6 Aug 2026, 12:59 GMT","sequence_badge_label":null,"sequence_count":null,"sequence_count_label":null,"sequence_frames":[],"sequence_kind":null,"source_name":"rfa_english_rss","source_name_label":"RFA English RSS","source_type":"rss","summary":"Construction is underway on Laos\u2019 latest large-scale Mekong River dam, satellite imagery analyzed by Radio Free Asia shows. Experts told RFA that the Pak Beng hydropower project will be like the other mainstream Mekong River dams, with Vientiane hopeful that sacrificing riparian ecosystems and relocating nearby villages will be worth the expected benefits to the economy. With dozens of hydropower dams either built or under construction on the Mekong River and its tributaries, Laos has gone all-in on its controversial economic strategy to become the \u201cBattery of Southeast Asia\u201d in hopes of selling electricity to neighboring countries. Pak Beng, when complete, will be the most upstream dam on the Mekong in Laos. It is a joint venture between a Chinese investment company and a Thai energy firm, it will have a generating capacity of 912 megawatts and is expected to produce an average of 4,775 gigawatt-hours annually\u2014enough to power a mid-sized U.S. city for a year. \u201cThe construction has quietly begun,\u201d Brian Eyler, director of the Southeast Asia program at the Washington-based Stimson Center, told RFA. \u201cOn paper, hydropower dams provide income for Laos by selling power to Thailand, Vietnam and Cambodia,\u201d he said. \u201cThis brings foreign currency into the country, which is more resilient than the kip, Laos\u2019 currency.\u201d Satellite imagery taken on July 29 shows a large earthen and rock embankment built across a bend in the river, creating a dry work area shielded from the river\u2019s flow. Within the diverted section, workers appear to be excavating and laying the foundation for the dam\u2019s main structure. Numerous dump trucks and excavators are visible cutting into bedrock and sediment on the riverbed and leveling the surface to prepare a foundation base for the dam, Bruce Songhak Chung, a senior researcher at the Seoul-based Korea Institute for Security Strategy, told RFA. The Pak Beng hydropower project began construction in late 2025 with a large earthen and rock embankment. Workers appear to be excavating and laying the foundation for the dam's main structure. (RFA) \u201cSatellite imagery shows what appear to be the early stages of a powerhouse building, a spillway, and foundational work for a ship lock and fish passage intended to allow vessel and aquatic movement past the dam once completed,\u201d Chung said. So far, only preparatory work has started and the main construction on the dam will begin in October 2026 after the wet season, Chandaly Mao, a communications officer with the Mekong River Commission, told RFA. According to the Mekong River Commission, preparatory works are under way, with the main construction scheduled to begin in October 2026, following the wet season. (RFA) The commission is an intergovernmental organization that works with the governments of the four Mekong basin countries to jointly manage the shared water resources and the sustainable development of the Mekong. \u201cWork will start with the construction of the first-stage cofferdam,\u201d Mao said, adding that the developer expects commercial operations to begin in 2033. One of many Meanwhile, further downstream, the Luang Prabang large-scale dam is more than 70% complete and will begin commercial operation in 2030 according to the commission. There are currently two operational dams and 9 others in various stages of completion according to the Stimson Center. Eyler said there are more than 100 dams in Laos on Mekong tributaries, including the Xayaburi dam, the largest currently in operation. Additionally, Myanmar and Laos signed a joint agreement to develop a new 2,790-megawatt Mekong mainstream dam on July 5. Little information has been released, but it is expected to sit in a canyon section of the Mekong along the Laos\u2013Myanmar border and it would be one of the largest dams planned on the Mekong, he added. \u201cAll these dams are built by foreign construction companies,\u201d Eyler said. \u201cLaos has the capability to build small dams but not large dams.\u201d Map of the hydropower plants along the Mekong, operational, planned, and postponed. (Stimson Center) Under this arrangement, the foreign construction company owns the dam for a set period \u2014 typically 20 to 30 years \u2014 collecting the income it generates, while the Lao government receives taxes and royalties, Eyler said. Once the contract ends, ownership transfers back to the Lao government. Many of the foreign players involved are Chinese firms or have Chinese backing, and critics are concerned that the arrangement ensnares Laos in a debt trap , making Vientiane increasingly malleable to Chinese creditors. \u201cThis is a sovereign decision of the Government of Lao PDR,\u201d Mao told RFA. \u201cA further consideration is that operating patterns are shaped by concession and power purchase agreements. It is therefore important that these agreements allow operating rules to be adapted for environmental purposes.\u201d Local economics Experts also warn the dams affect the livelihoods of the local communities and carry significant environmental and social impact downstream with effects that accumulate as more dams are built along the river. The dams generate electricity that is mostly sold to Thailand, which is beneficial to the country\u2019s bottom line, but local communities near the dams see little benefit. The Mekong River Commission has raised four concerns: sediment trapping, fish passage, changes to the flow regime, and socioeconomic impacts on communities that depend on fisheries. Fish passage is a particular concern, both for adults migrating upstream and for eggs and larvae drifting downstream through slow moving impoundments, Mao told RFA. Dozens of fish leap out of the water during feeding time at a fish farm on Son Island in Vietnam's Mekong Delta. (RFA) \u201cEven though some of these dams have fish ladders built into them, the fish ladders don\u2019t work very well,\u201d Eyler said. \u201cSo the fisheries are in a dire situation, and people rely on those fisheries for their food and for income as well.\u201d According to the Stimson Center\u2019s Mekong Dam Monitor project, fisheries are depleting and declining for local people along the entire run of the Mekong in Laos. In a section of the river where the borders of Laos, Myanmar and Thailand meet, entire villages have become ghost towns as fish stocks have collapsed. Chung said dams also trap sediment and nutrients that would otherwise flow downstream, potentially accelerating erosion in Vietnam\u2019s Mekong Delta and contributing to farmland loss and declining agricultural productivity. An artist\u2019s rendering of the Pak Beng Dam (www.pakbengpower.com) \u201cDams can also release large amounts of water suddenly, causing flooding downstream,\u201d Chung said, \u201cResidents of villages affected by flooding and construction could be forced to relocate, losing their homes and livelihoods.\u201d \u201cIt\u2019s very rare that people that live around dams benefit from those dams,\u201d Eyler said. \u201cTypically they bear the costs and then people far away get the benefits.\u201d Edited by Eugene Whong.","title":"Satellite imagery shows work underway on Laos\u2019 latest large Mekong River dam","topic":"Laos","translation_language":"","url":"https://rfa.org/english/laos/2026/08/06/mekong-dam-pak-beng-construction/","video_url":null}],"next_num":2,"page":1,"pages":3,"per_page":20,"prev_num":null,"total":46}