{"applied_filters":{"end_date":"","lang":"","language":"","network":"","page":1,"per_page":20,"search":"","source":"rfa_english_rss","start_date":"","topic":"South China Sea","type":""},"available_filters":{"language_choices":[{"label":"Choose Language","value":""},{"label":"English","value":"English"}],"network_choices":[{"label":"All networks","value":""},{"label":"RFA","value":"RFA"}],"source_choices":[{"label":"All sources","value":""},{"label":"RFA English RSS","value":"rfa_english_rss"}],"sources":["rfa_english_rss"],"topics":["China","Korea","Laos","Myanmar","Pacific","South China Sea","Tibet","Uyghur"],"types":[["","All types"],["article","Articles"],["video","Videos"],["clips","Clips"],["media","Media"]]},"has_next":false,"has_prev":false,"items":[{"article_body_paragraphs":[],"audio_source_url":null,"author":"Taejun Kang for RFA","available_dubs":[],"downloadable_assets":["https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/5YK7CSKI7BFNBPH73NILMKG4GY.jpg?auth=78977eae14bbea05d950ffa8c2abec7e12f3fe38d3c1be8d5b11b7de4eda0aab&smart=true&width=1500"],"duration_display":"0:00","duration_seconds":null,"embed_url":null,"id":8616,"image_caption":"Crew members of Chinese People's Liberation Army navy ship Qi Jiguang wave as their ship prepares to dock past flags of China and Indonesia at Tanjung Perak Port in Surabaya on Aug. 2, 2026.","image_url":"https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/5YK7CSKI7BFNBPH73NILMKG4GY.jpg?auth=78977eae14bbea05d950ffa8c2abec7e12f3fe38d3c1be8d5b11b7de4eda0aab&smart=true&width=1500","is_clip":false,"item_type":"article","item_type_label":"Article","language_label":"English","media_credit":"Taejun Kang for RFA","micro_label":"Photo","micro_label_kind":"gallery","network_label":"RFA","network_logo_url":"/static/uploads/direct_network_logos/rfa_ca00144ac549.png","published_at":"2026-08-25T01:22:34","published_at_display":"25 Aug 2026, 01:22 GMT","sequence_badge_label":null,"sequence_count":null,"sequence_count_label":null,"sequence_frames":[],"sequence_kind":null,"source_name":"rfa_english_rss","source_name_label":"RFA English RSS","source_type":"rss","summary":"Though China\u2019s first-ever naval exercise with another country\u2019s military in waters east of Taiwan this month was a relatively small operation, it could go a long way toward normalizing Beijing\u2019s presence around the democratic island. The Chinese frigate Honghe and Indonesia\u2019s KRI I Gusti Ngurah Rai-332 conducted a passing exercise east of Taiwan on Aug. 12, involving maritime communications, formation maneuvers and replenishment of fuel and supplies at sea. Reuters described it as China\u2019s first joint operation with a foreign military in those waters. China, which considers Taiwan to be part of its own territory, described it as a \u201cnavigation exercise.\u201d Taiwan, however, accused Beijing of using the drill to create the impression that China exercises jurisdiction over waters east of the island. Though the exercise itself was a brief three-hour meeting of ships which then went their separate ways, the exercise gave Beijing a record of a foreign navy conducting an activity with China in waters that Taipei says Beijing has no authority to police, Aniello Iannone, a lecturer in Indonesian and Southeast Asian politics at Diponegoro University in Indonesia, told RFA. Chinese and Indonesian ships in a joint exercise east of Taiwan, Aug. 12, 2026. (Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China) \u201cOnce the Indonesian navy sailed, Beijing acquired something it could not manufacture alone, corroboration, from a state with no stake in the Taiwan question, that the water east of the island is a place where cooperation with China happens normally,\u201d he said. Taiwan\u2019s military said the exercise did not change much from a security perspective. Wu Tien-jen, assistant deputy chief of the general staff for intelligence, told lawmakers that the Indonesian vessel was already traveling through the area, and that the activity had no direct military impact on Taiwan, though he said it carried geopolitical significance. Jakarta played down the significance of the exercise, saying its warship was returning from exercises in Vladivostok and that such passing exercises were routine acts of maritime diplomacy. Normalizing China\u2019s presence Indonesia has diplomatically transitioned to a Taiwan stance that aligns with China\u2019s position more closely than many other governments\u2014including by issuing a joint statement affirming Beijing\u2019s one-China principle in November 2024. But its participation in exercises with China east of Taiwan does not mean that it intended to legitimize Beijing\u2019s presence in the area, Joseph Kristanto, a research analyst at Singapore\u2019s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, told RFA. \u201cFor Jakarta, it\u2019s just routine defense diplomacy activities. But for Taipei, the concern is the precedent that such an activity could create,\u201d he said. \u201cJakarta may not intend to lend legitimacy or normalize China\u2019s military presence around Taiwan, but Beijing can still use the participation of a foreign navy to reinforce the impression that its military activities in these waters are increasingly normal.\u201d The location gives the episode greater significance for Taiwan, according to analysts. Unlike Taiwan\u2019s western coast, which faces mainland China across the Taiwan Strait, its eastern approaches open onto the Pacific and are regarded as crucial maritime lifelines in the event of a Chinese blockade or conflict, and Taipei has become increasingly concerned about Chinese activity there. China\u2019s coast guard began patrols east of Taiwan in June, later drawing expressions of concern from the United States, Britain, France and Germany. Taiwan subsequently reported a sharp rise in Chinese government-vessel activity around the island and warned that Beijing could be testing ways to disrupt Pacific supply routes. This photograph released by Taiwan's Military News Agency shows soldiers driving a personnel vehicle into a warship near Taiwan during the annual Han Kuang drill on Aug. 22, 2016. (Taiwan Military News Agency via AFP) During its annual nationwide Han Kuang military exercises this month, Taiwan\u2019s navy and coast guard also held their first joint anti-blockade drill, including a scenario in which a merchant vessel carrying essential supplies was escorted toward ports in eastern Taiwan. \u201cThe eastern approaches are the only side of Taiwan not overlooked by the Chinese mainland,\u201d Iannone said. \u201cThat\u2019s where resupply would come from in a blockade, and where American forces would arrive.\u201d He argued that Chinese survey ships, coast guard patrols and now the Indonesia exercise could be understood as part of a broader attempt to make Beijing\u2019s presence east of Taiwan appear administrative and routine rather than exceptional. The more important test will be whether the Indonesia exercise remains an isolated event, Kristanto said. A single passing exercise, or PASSEX, \u201cis unlikely to change the status quo,\u201d he said. \u201cIt would become more strategically meaningful if this develops into a pattern whereby similar exercises occur repeatedly, involve more foreign navies, become operationally more complex, or take place closer to Taiwan.\u201d Altering geopolitical narratives The key threshold could come if other countries begin to regard cooperation with China in those waters as politically unremarkable, Kristanto said. \u201cIn that scenario, Beijing would not necessarily need countries like Indonesia to directly endorse its sovereignty claims,\u201d he said, adding that the cumulative effect could still help normalise the PLA\u2019s presence around the island. Repetition of this exercise with the navies of other countries would shift the burden of the argument, Iannone said. \u201cAgainst an event, Taipei can object,\u201d he said. \u201cAgainst a routine, Taipei has to ask the international system to un-normalize something already normalized, which is a far harder thing to organize.\u201d Iannone said more complex exercises, participation by additional navies or operations moving closer to Taiwan would strengthen Beijing\u2019s case, but he also pointed to a less visible, but possibly more valuable indicator: whether records of such cooperation are cited as evidence of established practice. \u201cThe one I\u2019d watch hardest is documents,\u201d Iannone said. If records of joint activities east of Taiwan began to appear in notifications from the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Maritime Organization, or in arguments that attempt to declare the territory part of China\u2019s exclusive economic zone, \u201cthat\u2019s the transition from imagery to legal material.\u201d But there are also limits to how much Beijing can gain from such exercises. Indonesian navy personnel pull the mooring line of Chinese People's Liberation Army navy ship Kunlun Shan at Tanjung Perak Port in Surabaya on Aug 2, 2026. (Juni Kriswanto/AFP) Kristanto said Indonesia retains control over how it describes its military cooperation and has been careful to characterize the Aug. 12 drill as limited and routine. Jakarta also conducts military exercises with a wide range of countries, meaning the China drill alone does not demonstrate a strategic realignment. Beijing could even undermine its own objective if it attaches too much political meaning to foreign participation, he said. \u201cIf China attaches too much political significance to those interactions, it could make partners who do not want to be entangled in the geopolitical competition between China and the U.S. and its allies more cautious about participating in similar activities in the future,\u201d Kristanto said. Indonesia and China nevertheless signaled this week that broader defense cooperation is continuing. During high-level \u201c2+2\u201d talks in Jakarta on Aug. 20, their foreign and defense ministers agreed to deepen security ties, including military exercises and defense industry cooperation. For Taiwan, however, the concern is less whether Indonesia itself moves closer to Beijing than whether similar interactions begin accumulating without attracting much resistance. \u201cEffective jurisdiction doesn\u2019t arrive through recognition, but it accumulates,\u201d Iannone said. \u201cNo sovereignty changes hands at any point, what it shifts is the threshold at which something registers as worth noticing, and that threshold is where the political work happens.\u201d Edited by Eugene Whong.","title":"Indonesia-China naval drill could help normalize Beijing\u2019s presence east of Taiwan","topic":"South China Sea","translation_language":"","url":"https://rfa.org/english/southchinasea/2026/08/25/indonesia-china-taiwan-east-exercise-navy/","video_url":null},{"article_body_paragraphs":[],"audio_source_url":null,"author":"Taejun Kang for RFA","available_dubs":[],"downloadable_assets":["https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/PB26GUT7JNHJTOMAY3G27UVNWY.jpg?auth=0c63704ad664ade4bb391142c38a2167020059fdc4a82954b652dbb1fadc46a2&smart=true&width=1500"],"duration_display":"0:00","duration_seconds":null,"embed_url":null,"id":7012,"image_caption":"A teacher talks to students as classes open for the new school year at an elementary school in Manila on June 8, 2026.","image_url":"https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/PB26GUT7JNHJTOMAY3G27UVNWY.jpg?auth=0c63704ad664ade4bb391142c38a2167020059fdc4a82954b652dbb1fadc46a2&smart=true&width=1500","is_clip":false,"item_type":"article","item_type_label":"Article","language_label":"English","media_credit":"Taejun Kang for RFA","micro_label":"Photo","micro_label_kind":"gallery","network_label":"RFA","network_logo_url":"/static/uploads/direct_network_logos/rfa_ca00144ac549.png","published_at":"2026-08-19T21:08:37","published_at_display":"19 Aug 2026, 21:08 GMT","sequence_badge_label":null,"sequence_count":null,"sequence_count_label":null,"sequence_frames":[],"sequence_kind":null,"source_name":"rfa_english_rss","source_name_label":"RFA English RSS","source_type":"rss","summary":"A bill that would integrate the Philippines\u2019 South China Sea territorial claims into school curricula could further integrate the issue into national identity and strengthen public support, experts told Radio Free Asia. Philippine lawmakers this month filed a measure seeking to institutionalize education about what Manila calls the West Philippine Sea \u2013 the parts of the South China Sea that fall within its exclusive economic zone. The sea is a major flashpoint in regional geopolitics. China uses a nine-dash line drawn on the map to delineate the entirety of the sea as its own territory, but parts of it are also claimed by the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei and Malaysia. The proposed West Philippine Sea Education Act would establish an education and awareness program covering basic and higher education. Lessons would use examples from international law to support Manila\u2019s claims, including a section on the 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague, which said that China\u2019s nine-dash line had no legal basis. Popular support is critical for Manila to pursue its claims, Jason Ng Sze Chieh, a lecturer at INTI International College Subang in Malaysia, told RFA. The claims \u201cmust be grounded in tangible, convincing, and easily digestible arguments formed around reasonings \u2026 that excite the public imagination,\u201d he said. \u201cOnce it catches the public\u2019s imagination, it is very difficult to redirect or scrub it from the collective mind.\u201d The overlapping claims of China and the Philippines in the South China Sea. (AFP) The proposal comes as Philippine authorities increasingly describe their confrontation with Beijing not only as a contest over ships and maritime access, but also over information and public perceptions. Lawmakers behind the House measure said students should be equipped against misinformation and propaganda about the country\u2019s maritime rights. From public awareness to strategy If signed into law, the bill would formalize a campaign that has already been moving into Philippine schools and other youth-oriented spaces. The Department of Education\u2019s regional offices have begun integrating West Philippine Sea topics into social studies curricula, while government agencies have held engagements with teachers and students. Earlier this year, Manila also expanded efforts to produce child-focused material about the disputed waters. In January 2025, Philippine agencies launched a 40-page comic book explaining maritime zones and international law. National Security Adviser Eduardo A\u00f1o said it complemented government efforts to counter what Manila called distorted Chinese narratives, while the Chinese Embassy accused the Philippines of \u201cpolitical manipulation.\u201d National Security Adviser Eduardo A\u00f1o and Philippine Coast Guard Spokesperson for the South China Sea Jay Tarriela stand next to a giant copy of the book \"The Stories of Teacher Jun\" during its launch at the National Library of the Philippines in Manila, Jan. 24, 2025. (Lisa Marie David/Reuters) Ng said using education as soft power could reinforce the Philippines\u2019 claim without resorting to confrontation with China. \u201cIt is the right move for the Philippines, which wishes to resolve this issue without resorting to violence,\u201d he said. \u201cSoft power, through education, can reinforce its claim and strengthen the government\u2019s resolve to push back against China\u2019s claim.\u201d The approach also reflects how governments across the region have used historical narratives to sustain their respective South China Sea positions. In Vietnam, authorities have directed schools to include material asserting Vietnamese sovereignty over Ho\u00e0ng Sa, the Paracel Islands, and Tr\u01b0\u1eddng Sa, the Spratly Islands, island groups that are also claimed entirely by China and Taiwan and partly by the other South China Sea claimants. Chinese educational material has also presented disputed features through Beijing\u2019s sovereignty narrative. A 2017 New Yorker report examined a primary-school Mandarin lesson about the Xisha Islands, China\u2019s name for the Paracels, that described the islands as part of China without discussing Vietnam\u2019s competing claim. Taiwan offers a different lesson Taiwan on paper continues to claim all territory previously claimed during the era when the Republic of China controlled the mainland, but Taipei\u2019s post-1990s shift toward a more Taiwan-centered educational framework gradually weakened the domestic prominence of its older South China Sea claims. This offers a contrast to Manila\u2019s current direction, Jozef Huljak, a Ph.D candidate in political science at Constantine the Philosopher University in Slovakia, whose research examines Taiwan\u2019s cultural and public diplomacy, told RFA. Taiwanese fishermen display flags and placards before departing to Taiping island, part of the disputed Spratly Islands chain in the South China Sea, at a fishing harbour in southern Pingtung on July 20, 2016. (The office of Kuomintang lawmaker Johnny Chiang/AFP) \u201cThe lesson is not that education determines territorial attitudes on its own,\u201d he said. \u201cIt is that education helps turn a legal claim into something the public understands as its own. Without that process, a claim can remain legally alive while becoming politically inert.\u201d Taiwan continues to control Taiping Island, the largest naturally formed feature in the Spratlys, but the South China Sea has comparatively little prominence in contemporary Taiwanese politics, Huljak said. That experience also points to a potential cost for Manila. \u201cOnce a claim is taught to children as a matter of national dignity, future governments may find it harder to negotiate fishing arrangements, provisional agreements or other compromises without appearing to retreat from something the state itself taught as national territory,\u201d Huljak said. For the Philippines, that may be precisely part of the appeal in the short term: ensuring that its South China Sea position survives changes of government and remains backed by voters long after the current confrontations at sea have passed. Teaching the dispute in classrooms may therefore do more than explain where the Philippines says its maritime rights begin and end, Ng said. It could help determine how politically negotiable those rights become for governments years from now. \u201cBefore a shot is fired, if one side wins the war of public perception, then the struggle is half won,\u201d he said. Edited by Eugene Whong.","title":"Philippines bets on classrooms to strengthen South China Sea claims","topic":"South China Sea","translation_language":"","url":"https://rfa.org/english/southchinasea/2026/08/19/philippines-south-china-sea-education/","video_url":null},{"article_body_paragraphs":[],"audio_source_url":null,"author":"Jason Gutierrez for RFA","available_dubs":[],"downloadable_assets":["https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/OWURW2ZBZND7RNWDSUETPYFQJ4.JPG?auth=9c787a5f2a4dfd94de1c91661c5e586ee723ed6ed9dd63733ed75b4b22fb8a90&smart=true&width=1500"],"duration_display":"0:00","duration_seconds":null,"embed_url":null,"id":6266,"image_caption":"Workers inspect power devices at a Philippines-based semiconductor manufacturing plant in Manila Dec. 10, 2008.","image_url":"https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/OWURW2ZBZND7RNWDSUETPYFQJ4.JPG?auth=9c787a5f2a4dfd94de1c91661c5e586ee723ed6ed9dd63733ed75b4b22fb8a90&smart=true&width=1500","is_clip":false,"item_type":"article","item_type_label":"Article","language_label":"English","media_credit":"Jason Gutierrez for RFA","micro_label":"Photo","micro_label_kind":"gallery","network_label":"RFA","network_logo_url":"/static/uploads/direct_network_logos/rfa_ca00144ac549.png","published_at":"2026-08-18T01:40:52","published_at_display":"18 Aug 2026, 01:40 GMT","sequence_badge_label":null,"sequence_count":null,"sequence_count_label":null,"sequence_frames":[],"sequence_kind":null,"source_name":"rfa_english_rss","source_name_label":"RFA English RSS","source_type":"rss","summary":"Updated on Aug. 18, 2026 at 11:49 a.m. ET MANILA, Philippines \u2013 A U.S. plan to build a critical technology hub in the Philippines is a symbolic return to the site of one of its largest overseas former bases, experts in the country told Radio Free Asia. The hub will be part of the U.S.-led Pax Silica initiative, aimed at shoring up supply chains for semiconductors, AI and rare earth elements. It will be built in New Clark City, north of Manila, on land that was part of a U.S. military reservation complex that included Clark Air Base, until the Philippines voted to take control of it in 1991. Supporters of the plan tout its potential economic benefits \u2013 the project will create around 200,000 jobs and up to US$70 billion in investment \u2013 but critics say that the plan is cedes too much control to Washington, and could be potentially harmful to the environment. Either way, the historical significance of a major U.S. project on the grounds of the former base is not lost on observers. \u201cI see the symbolic value of the U.S. returning to Clark,\u201d Chester Cabalza, founder of the Manila-based think tank International Development and Security Cooperation, told RFA. \u201cIt centers on an historic reversal of geopolitical fortunes, transforming a symbol of post-Cold War retreat into a modern monument of the ironclad U.S.-Philippine alliance.\u201d Passengers queue to enter the Diosdado Macapagal International airport, formerly Clark Air Base in Pampanga province north of Manila, March 26, 2008. Other parts of the former U.S. Air Base and the associated military reserve are today part of New Clark City, a planned community that will feature a new technology hub. (Romeo Ranoco/Reuters) The battlefield has evolved since the Cold War era, but just as Clark Air Base was a key cog in the U.S.\u2019 Asian containment strategy of that era, the Pax Silica hub is intended to secure technology supply chains for Washington and its allies, even as China has launched its own global AI framework. Chinese President Xi Jinping in July launched the Shanghai-based World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization, or WAICO, promoting a Beijing-led AI ecosystem and analysts say that Washington may soon ask countries to choose Pax Silica over Xi\u2019s group. \u2018Purely Practical\u2019 Though analysts see a global tug of war between Beijing and Washington spilling over into the technology arena, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., while addressing a forum of the Foreign Correspondents Association of the Philippines Friday said that the Philippines\u2019 involvement in the plan is economic in nature and is \u201cpurely practical\u201d rather than political. The Philippines has territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea, which Beijing claims in its entirety, but which Manila claims in part. Marcos acknowledged the dispute, but said the Philippines\u2019 Pax Silica plans were more about fostering an economic partnership. \u201cAll of these\u2026conflicting claims in the West Philippine Sea simply did not enter into that discussion,\u201d he said, referring to the part of the sea that lies within Manila\u2019s exclusive economic zone. \u201cAnd so, the idea that we are somehow distancing ourselves from China is quite the contrary.\u201d Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. addresses the Foreign Correspondents Association of the Philippines in Manila, Aug. 14, 2026. (Jason Gutierrez/RFA) Manila, he said, was open to investment opportunities from anyone interested \u201cas long as it is to the mutual benefit of all parties involved\u201d and will grab the opportunity \u201cno matter where it comes from.\u201d \u201cAs long as we are able to move the economy forward and to better the lives of our people, then that is something that we will certainly examine,\u201d Marcos stressed. \u201cAnd if it turns out that this is a beneficial agreement or arrangement, then certainly we will become part of it.\u201d Though the tech hub will create jobs, it will facilitate the entry into the Philippines of U.S. military personnel and compromise its sovereignty, Teddy Casino, leader of the nationalist Bayan group that has been protesting Pax Silica, told RFA. \u201cThe promise of economic development under U.S. patronage is the same deception that U.S. imperialism has been peddling in the past 128 years of its colonial and neocolonial rule in the Philippines,\u201d he said. \u201cUnder Pax Silica, Filipinos are once again being told the lie that surrendering greater economic and strategic space to the US is synonymous with development.\u201d People march as they protest against Pax Silica, a U.S.-led initiative, in Manila on August 13, 2026. (Jam Sta Rosa/AFP) Raffy Tulfo of the Philippines Senate, who heads the committee on the environment has filed a resolution seeking to investigate the project to determine its economic, environmental, social, technological, and national security implications. Tulfo said there were many legitimate concerns about the project, despite its touted benefits. \u201cWhile such investments may contribute significantly to economic growth, technology transfer, innovation, and job creation, they have likewise generated public concerns and policy questions,\u201d he said in his resolution. Among the concerns raised in the resolution are land use and urban planning, water consumption, resource allocation, and environmental sustainability, as well as the project\u2019s potential impact on the rights, welfare, cultural integrity, and ancestral domains of indigenous peoples and local communities. But the benefits outweigh the risks, Cabalza said. \u201cThis strategic investment, when wisely planned, will bring an influx of financing infrastructure and economic defense in the digital supply chain,\u201d he said, But he acknowledged that the Philippines\u2019 participation in Pax Silica could provoke China to retaliate with economic pressure. \u201cFor China, with the advent of the US-led AI investment through the Pax Silica, the more they will tighten their economic and security grip in the Philippines,\u201d he said, pointing out that one of the measures Beijing may employ is restricting Philippine agricultural and raw materials exports. Defense vs. malign influence More than anything, the Washington-designed Pax Silica is seen as a defense against malign Chinese influence, Vincent Kyle Parada, a defense analyst at the De La Salle-College of Saint Benilde in Manila, told RFA. \u201cDealing with Chinese firms is simply too big of a risk for Manila. Beijing\u2019s reach extends far,\u201d he said. \u201cThat\u2019s really why the US introduced Pax Silica to begin with. The distinction between economics and security is fast disintegrating, and Washington needs to secure its supply chains from any form of malign interference.\u201d A Filipino manufacturing operator is reflected on an Automatic Mould machine at a Philippine-based semiconductor manufacturing plant in Manila Sept. 20, 2005. (Cheryl Ravelo/Reuters) The proposed Philippines Pax Silica hub is part of Washington\u2019s \u201cfriend-shoring\u201d strategy \u2013 transferring production to \u201cfriendly\u201d countries in order to mitigate risks, he said. \u201cManila is Washington\u2019s only treaty ally in Southeast Asia. It is not a part of the China-led WAICO and is, therefore, not as deeply embedded into China\u2019s AI and semiconductor supply chain compared to its neighbors,\u201d Parada said. \u201cThat makes it the perfect candidate for Pax Silica, while at the same time, benefitting Manila by providing Washington more skin in the game in its continued commitment to the US-Philippine alliance.\u201d The Philippines participation is an expression of its own strategic autonomy, Arnaud Leveau, president of the Paris-based Asia Center, told RFA. He said that while the Philippines needed to diversify some of its dependencies, including in areas such as semiconductors, \u201cit should not mean exchanging dependence on China for excessive dependence on another external partner.\u201d \u201cThe central issue, in my view, is whether the Philippines can use this initiative to strengthen its own technological and industrial sovereignty rather than simply becoming a geographical platform within somebody else\u2019s supply chain,\u201d said Leveau, who also teaches at the Paris Dauphine University. But he warned that a complete technological or economic disengagement from China would be extremely difficult and probably undesirable. \u201cChina is not simply a geopolitical competitor. It is also one of the world\u2019s major industrial and technological ecosystems,\u201d Leveau stressed. \u201cChinese companies are increasingly important in AI, batteries, electric vehicles, telecommunications, renewable energy and advanced manufacturing.\u201d Edited by Eugene Whong. Update adds comments from Casino and details about Senate resolution.","title":"Proposed US-led tech hub in the Philippines will secure supply chains, create jobs","topic":"South China Sea","translation_language":"","url":"https://rfa.org/english/southchinasea/2026/08/18/pax-silica-philippines-us-clark/","video_url":null},{"article_body_paragraphs":[],"audio_source_url":null,"author":"Taejun Kang for RFA","available_dubs":[],"downloadable_assets":["https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/LKNAG77BFBH2BCH3JWRXT3U2IM.JPG?auth=b3690353f1189105b7dd90d56ab431d3280c2cc9f4d9a3595a3974ac8c662b51&smart=true&width=1500"],"duration_display":"0:00","duration_seconds":null,"embed_url":null,"id":3825,"image_caption":"Crew members stand aboard a Kuang Hua VI-class missile boat with a Taiwan flag in the background during the annual Han Kuang military exercises at a navy base in Kaohsiung, Taiwan, Aug. 8, 2026.","image_url":"https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/LKNAG77BFBH2BCH3JWRXT3U2IM.JPG?auth=b3690353f1189105b7dd90d56ab431d3280c2cc9f4d9a3595a3974ac8c662b51&smart=true&width=1500","is_clip":false,"item_type":"article","item_type_label":"Article","language_label":"English","media_credit":"Taejun Kang for RFA","micro_label":"Photo","micro_label_kind":"gallery","network_label":"RFA","network_logo_url":"/static/uploads/direct_network_logos/rfa_ca00144ac549.png","published_at":"2026-08-11T02:45:29","published_at_display":"11 Aug 2026, 02:45 GMT","sequence_badge_label":null,"sequence_count":null,"sequence_count_label":null,"sequence_frames":[],"sequence_kind":null,"source_name":"rfa_english_rss","source_name_label":"RFA English RSS","source_type":"rss","summary":"Taiwan is trapped between sea rocks and a hard place: As the Philippines has filed documentation to strengthen its claims in the South China Sea, Taipei must balance asserting its own conflicting claims with building closer ties with Manila, especially as a potential ally against Chinese aggression, experts told Radio Free Asia. The Philippines on July 29 submitted its official nautical chart of Scarborough Shoal, a disputed feature in what Manila calls the West Philippine Sea \u2013 the section of the South China Sea that is within its exclusive economic zone \u2013 to the United Nations, to bolster its claim on the area, which is also claimed by China and Taiwan. Beijing immediately protested the filing, accusing Manila of infringing on Chinese sovereignty. Taiwan also opposed the move, but in a way that did not outright condemn the Philippines. It also repeated its call for Taiwan to be included in negotiations over South China Sea disputes. \u201cThe filing adds specificity to a Philippine position that was already well established,\u201d Sylwia M. Gorska, a doctoral candidate in international relations at the University of Central Lancashire in the United Kingdom, told RFA. \u201cFor Taiwan, the consequence is not the loss of its claim, but a further deterioration in its relative ability to make that claim consequential.\u201d The overlapping claims of China and the Philippines in the South China Sea. (AFP) The episode highlights an increasingly awkward tension for President Lai Ching-te\u2019s government. That government considers itself to be the continuation of the Republic of China, or ROC, and thus continues to formally claim land it historically laid claim to, dating back to the era that it controlled the mainland, including Scarborough Shoal and other South China Sea features. Meanwhile, the Philippines has become an increasingly important security partner as both governments contend with pressure from Beijing. Official status Unlike Manila and Beijing, Taipei is excluded from the United Nations and has limited ability to advocate for its claims via the same international processes being used by other claimants. But Taiwan\u2019s exclusion from the U.N. system does not invalidate its claim, Aadil Brar, a Taipei-based independent analyst and former visiting scholar at National Chengchi University, told RFA. \u201cThe real problem is procedural rather than substantive,\u201d Brar told RFA. Taiwan can continue asserting sovereignty through Foreign Ministry statements and other diplomatic channels, he said, but cannot participate on equivalent terms in the international mechanisms through which Manila is formalizing its position. That disadvantage is compounded by Taiwan\u2019s lack of a physical role around Scarborough. Gorska noted that China has exercised de facto control around the shoal since 2012 and sharply increased its Coast Guard presence there, while Philippine Coast Guard and fisheries vessels continue to challenge Chinese restrictions. An Oct. 12, 2025, photo distributed by the Philippine Coast Guard shows a China coast guard ship, right, deploying a water cannon at a Philippine Bureau of Fisheries vessel near Thitu Island in disputed waters of the South China Sea. (Philippine Coast Guard via AFP) \u201cIn practice, Scarborough is now contested primarily by China and the Philippines,\u201d she said. \u201cThey are the states maintaining presence, generating the confrontations and forcing decisions about how far coercion can go before it carries wider diplomatic or alliance consequences.\u201d \u201cTaiwan remains a claimant, but it is largely absent from those day-to-day interactions and therefore has limited influence over the operational conditions around the shoal.\u201d Strategic restraint Taiwan\u2019s weak operational position gives Taipei little incentive to turn the Philippine filing into a serious bilateral dispute, analysts said. The Philippines\u2019 northern islands sit close to Taiwan and the Luzon Strait, a key maritime passage that could become strategically important in any cross-Strait conflict. The Philippines is also a U.S. treaty ally and has expanded military cooperation with Washington. Gorska pointed to the deployment of the U.S. NMESIS anti-ship missile system in Batanes during this year\u2019s Balikatan exercises as an example of the growing military relevance of the northern Philippines to Taiwan\u2019s security environment. \u201cA more forceful Taiwanese response would signal continued commitment to the ROC claim, but it would do little to improve Taipei\u2019s position at Scarborough and could impose costs on a relationship that may matter far more in a cross-Strait crisis,\u201d she said. It is for this reason that disputes between Manila and Taipei will likely be handled quietly, Enrico Cau, a Taipei-based independent security researcher, told RFA. \u201cUnder the current situation it is likely that most differences on disputes in the South China Sea between Taiwan and the Philippines will be ironed out through diplomatic channels and a carefully dosed media exposure, where disagreements are manifested with moderation,\u201d Cau said. Philippine military servicemen take part in a counter-landing live fire exercise during the annual US-Philippines joint military \"Balikatan\" exercise in Rizal, Palawan, Philippines, April 28, 2025. (Jam Sta Rosa/AFP) He said actions by the Philippines and other regional governments were primarily aimed at countering China rather than challenging Taiwan, giving Taipei an additional reason to exercise restraint. Brar similarly said Taiwan\u2019s response to Manila had been notably softer than the language it typically uses when responding to Chinese moves in disputed waters. \u201cTaiwan is almost certainly going to downplay this dispute, and its actual response already shows that,\u201d he said. Domestic politics In Taiwan, the restrained approach has become a hotly debated issue in the political arena. Chen I-hsin, Culture and Communications Committee Chair of the main opposition Kuomintang (KMT), accused the government of applying double standards, contrasting its muted reaction to the Philippine filing with its criticism last year of China\u2019s establishment of a nature reserve at Scarborough Shoal. Chen urged the Foreign Ministry to negotiate with Manila to defend Taiwan\u2019s sovereignty. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) lawmaker Wu Szu-yao pushed back, saying Taiwan and the Philippines were both victims of Chinese aggression and arguing that the KMT should instead direct its criticism at Chinese leader Xi Jinping. The dispute reflects a broader divergence over how much political weight Taiwan should give to historic South China Sea claims from the era that the ROC controlled the mainland. Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung acknowledged in July that Taiwan was not actively pressing its South China Sea claims, while maintaining that its formal sovereignty position had not changed. Gorska said that distinction was important. \u201cThe Lai administration appears to be reducing the political salience of the ROC\u2019s traditional South China Sea claims rather than abandoning them,\u201d she said. \u201cThe claims remain formally intact, but Taipei is no longer treating their public assertion as an objective in itself.\u201d A rally opposing a scaled-down defense budget passed by the legislature in Taipei on May 23, 2026. (I-hwa Cheng/AFP) Taiwan continues to administer Taiping Island, the largest naturally occurring feature in the Spratly Islands, and has reaffirmed its South China Sea claims when challenged. But analysts said Taipei appears increasingly selective about which claims warrant sustained political attention. Cau said there were signs within the DPP of a more pragmatic approach that placed greater emphasis on international law and on territory Taiwan could realistically control and defend. It remained unclear, he said, whether Lai\u2019s softer approach represented a genuine move away from traditional ROC claims or simply an attempt to navigate an increasingly complex regional security environment. For Taipei, that ambiguity may itself be useful, according to analysts. Taiwan can preserve its formal sovereignty position without allowing a remote shoal it does not control to disrupt a relationship with Manila that is becoming more consequential to its security. But the Philippine filing also points to a longer-term risk for Taiwan \u2013 if regional governments increasingly formalize maritime claims through U.N. filings or eventually reach agreements governing behavior in the South China Sea, Taiwan could find rules affecting its interests being shaped without its participation, Cau said. Edited by Eugene Whong.","title":"Taiwan soft-pedals Scarborough claim as Manila ties take priority","topic":"South China Sea","translation_language":"","url":"https://rfa.org/english/southchinasea/2026/08/11/taiwan-philippines-scarborough-shoal-filing/","video_url":null},{"article_body_paragraphs":[],"audio_source_url":null,"author":"Taejun Kang for RFA","available_dubs":[],"downloadable_assets":["https://d3ayjbmlrrjm3o.cloudfront.net/wp-radiofreeasia/20260729/6a6a8d97fa7c3d0af1ac3add/t_49bb841b16ab469da5d5128a4b73c527_name_finallyfinalfinal/file_540x960-1600-v4.mp4","https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/QMVEICKBZJBY7KMMVYT7V7VWUI.png?auth=81b7c0370781fcce8fd850bf6c32ddab3e104bde48b84dfc358244f6bd6fa21e&smart=true&width=1500"],"duration_display":"0:00","duration_seconds":null,"embed_url":null,"id":11332,"image_caption":"An image from \"I Miss You on the South China Sea,\" a music video produced by the Chinese government.","image_url":"https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/QMVEICKBZJBY7KMMVYT7V7VWUI.png?auth=81b7c0370781fcce8fd850bf6c32ddab3e104bde48b84dfc358244f6bd6fa21e&smart=true&width=1500","is_clip":true,"item_type":"video","item_type_label":"Video","language_label":"English","media_credit":"Taejun Kang for RFA","micro_label":"Video report","micro_label_kind":"video","network_label":"RFA","network_logo_url":"/static/uploads/direct_network_logos/rfa_ca00144ac549.png","published_at":"2026-07-22T20:38:57","published_at_display":"22 Jul 2026, 20:38 GMT","sequence_badge_label":null,"sequence_count":null,"sequence_count_label":null,"sequence_frames":[],"sequence_kind":null,"source_name":"rfa_english_rss","source_name_label":"RFA English RSS","source_type":"rss","summary":"Experts say music video aims to humanize China\u2019s coast guard while reflecting Beijing\u2019s stance in the disputed sea.","title":"\u2018Quantum entanglement\u2019: Love song asserts China\u2019s South China Sea claims","topic":"South China Sea","translation_language":"","url":"https://rfa.org/english/southchinasea/2026/07/22/south-china-sea-music-video-song/","video_url":"https://d3ayjbmlrrjm3o.cloudfront.net/wp-radiofreeasia/20260729/6a6a8d97fa7c3d0af1ac3add/t_49bb841b16ab469da5d5128a4b73c527_name_finallyfinalfinal/file_540x960-1600-v4.mp4"},{"article_body_paragraphs":[],"audio_source_url":null,"author":"Taejun Kang for RFA","available_dubs":[],"downloadable_assets":["https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/QMVEICKBZJBY7KMMVYT7V7VWUI.png?auth=81b7c0370781fcce8fd850bf6c32ddab3e104bde48b84dfc358244f6bd6fa21e&smart=true&width=1500"],"duration_display":"0:00","duration_seconds":null,"embed_url":null,"id":80,"image_caption":"An image from \"I Miss You on the South China Sea,\" a music video produced by the Chinese government.","image_url":"https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/QMVEICKBZJBY7KMMVYT7V7VWUI.png?auth=81b7c0370781fcce8fd850bf6c32ddab3e104bde48b84dfc358244f6bd6fa21e&smart=true&width=1500","is_clip":false,"item_type":"article","item_type_label":"Article","language_label":"English","media_credit":"Taejun Kang for RFA","micro_label":"Photo","micro_label_kind":"gallery","network_label":"RFA","network_logo_url":"/static/uploads/direct_network_logos/rfa_ca00144ac549.png","published_at":"2026-07-22T20:38:57","published_at_display":"22 Jul 2026, 20:38 GMT","sequence_badge_label":null,"sequence_count":null,"sequence_count_label":null,"sequence_frames":[],"sequence_kind":null,"source_name":"rfa_english_rss","source_name_label":"RFA English RSS","source_type":"rss","summary":"UPDATED on July 22, 2026 at 10:16 p.m. ET The video opens with an aerial shot of a lone China Coast Guard ship at sea on a calm day, as soft, whimsical music carries us into China\u2019s latest propaganda song. \u201cAzure sky, crystal sea, chasing gulls, blazing sun, patrolling the South China Sea, guarding endless loneliness, endless vastness, and guarding this sea, this peace and harmony.\u201d The lyrics of the first verse introduce the setting \u2013 this is a song about an enlisted member of the coast guard stationed on the disputed sea, thinking longingly about someone he loves back home. In later verses, he asks her what color the clouds are where she is, what perfume she\u2019s wearing, and if she\u2019s drinking coffee or tea, because he\u2019d like a taste too. The song, \u201cI Miss You on the South China Sea,\u201d is Beijing\u2019s latest attempt to use popular culture to shape international perceptions of one of Asia\u2019s most contentious maritime disputes, analysts told Radio Free Asia. Analysts say a new South China Sea pop song is propaganda (RFA Video) The English version of the music video was released this month by Chinese state media to coincide with the 10th anniversary of the 2016 international arbitral tribunal ruling that rejected the legal basis of Beijing\u2019s sweeping claims over most of the disputed waters. A Mandarin version debuted about six months earlier during the Lantern Festival, a Chinese cultural event that marks the end of Lunar New Year celebrations and the coming of spring. Though the English version is seemingly intended to appeal to an international audience, the analysts questioned whether this campaign is likely to resonate beyond viewers and listeners already sympathetic to China. \u201cChina\u2019s state media spends little time actually thinking about how the message will be received elsewhere,\u201d Ed Moon, an independent cross-Strait analyst and founder of intelligence site Strait Signal, told RFA. \u201cIts major focus is on ensuring that the overall message correctly aligns with the official narrative.\u201d At one point, the singer uses a quantum physics term romantically, telling his beloved that he would cross time and space to prove with her \u201cwhat quantum entanglement is.\u201d But despite the apparent awkwardness of the English lyrics, the song attempts to portray China Coast Guard personnel as ordinary people with very real feelings of longing for home and those they love, while their duties have called them far away to the remoteness of the open sea. Controlling the narrative The video reflects a broader effort by Beijing to complement official statements with emotionally driven storytelling, as China increasingly seeks to communicate its positions through documentaries, influencers, short videos and other forms of popular media. \u201cChina wants to project its presence in the South China Sea as peaceful, benign and wholly normal. The focus on the human aspect of the coast guard crew members fits this pattern,\u201d Moon said, adding that Beijing\u2019s state media is primarily concerned with ensuring content aligns with the Communist Party\u2019s official narrative rather than persuading foreign audiences. A China Coast Guard ship monitors a Philippine fisherman aboard his wooden boat in the disputed South China Sea, May 16, 2024. (Ted Aljibe/AFP) Within China\u2019s political system, he said, Beijing\u2019s sovereignty claims are treated as historically and factually self-evident, leaving little perceived need to explain them to overseas audiences. Instead, Moon said, China has increasingly outsourced the task of \u201cexplaining\u201d the country to foreign employees working within its media system and to overseas influencers who produce favorable content about China. As a result, English-language state media has become less important than maintaining consistency with Beijing\u2019s messaging. He also noted a growing emphasis on producing content in both Chinese and English, describing it as evidence of tighter coordination across state media outlets and a renewed focus on overseas Chinese communities, which Beijing increasingly sees as receptive audiences. An image from the \"I Miss You on the South China Sea\" music video produced by the Chinese government. (China Military Bugle via YouTube) The song represents an effort to use culture as a political tool while softening the image of the China Coast Guard, Jason Ng Sze Chieh, a lecturer at INTI International College Subang in Malaysia, told RFA. \u201cAn attempt to instrumentalize culture and popular media, asserting China\u2019s authority to patrol and \u2018protect\u2019 the South China Sea,\u201d Ng said. \u201cThe music video is the other track: a targeted production built specifically to sell a peaceful image of China.\u201d Defending Beijing\u2019s interests Ng said the song consciously rebrands the China Coast Guard as \u201ca benign force rather than \u2018Wolf Warrior,\u2019\u201d using themes of intimacy and personal sacrifice while leaving the underlying political message unchanged. \u201cThe message underneath doesn\u2019t change \u2013 China is defending its interests, and nothing else,\u201d he said. Ng contrasted the music video with what he described as another strand of Beijing\u2019s influence strategy \u2013 embracing successful cultural works that were not originally created by the state but later align with its messaging. A Chinese Coast Guard ship fires a water cannon at Unaizah May 4, a Philippine Navy-chartered vessel, conducting a resupply mission to troops stationed at Second Thomas Shoal, on March 5, 2024 in the South China Sea. (Ezra Acayan/Getty Images) He said Beijing increasingly pursues \u201ctwo tracks,\u201d continuing to produce explicitly patriotic material while also co-opting independently produced content that promotes a favorable image of China, particularly among overseas Chinese communities. \u201cThe music video feels like artificial intelligence-generated slop, rendered in the soothing style of Chinese pop and designed to sell the world on China\u2019s \u2018peaceful\u2019 intentions,\u201d Ng said, adding that the production\u2019s visuals and even the singer\u2019s voice appeared artificial. China has increasingly sought to present its coast guard as a professional force maintaining order in what it considers its own waters, even as confrontations with Philippine and Vietnamese vessels have intensified in recent years. Beijing says its actions are lawful and necessary to safeguard its sovereignty, while rival claimants accuse it of intimidation and coercion. The 2016 ruling by an international tribunal in The Hague found that China\u2019s expansive \u201cnine-dash line\u201d claims had no legal basis under international law. China rejected the ruling and continues to assert sovereignty over most of the South China Sea, where competing claims by the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan have made the waterway one of the region\u2019s most volatile flashpoints. Edited by Eugene Whong. Update specifies that the Mandarin version preceded the English version by roughly six months.","title":"\u2018Quantum entanglement\u2019: Love song asserts China\u2019s South China Sea claims","topic":"South China Sea","translation_language":"","url":"https://rfa.org/english/southchinasea/2026/07/22/south-china-sea-music-video-song/","video_url":null},{"article_body_paragraphs":[],"audio_source_url":null,"author":"Taejun Kang for RFA","available_dubs":[],"downloadable_assets":["https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/FMNGGS5DUFFOFIPIE457PD7G3Q.JPG?auth=bbf5a0cdbb4988950935a44456370451651f702009236a3bd9084ebd06586d6d&smart=true&width=1500"],"duration_display":"0:00","duration_seconds":null,"embed_url":null,"id":85,"image_caption":"Japan's Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi, left, and Philippines Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro at the Balikatan joint military exercises between U.S., Australian, Filipino and Japanese troops in Paoay, Ilocos Norte, Philippines, May 6, 2026.","image_url":"https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/FMNGGS5DUFFOFIPIE457PD7G3Q.JPG?auth=bbf5a0cdbb4988950935a44456370451651f702009236a3bd9084ebd06586d6d&smart=true&width=1500","is_clip":false,"item_type":"article","item_type_label":"Article","language_label":"English","media_credit":"Taejun Kang for RFA","micro_label":"Photo","micro_label_kind":"gallery","network_label":"RFA","network_logo_url":"/static/uploads/direct_network_logos/rfa_ca00144ac549.png","published_at":"2026-07-14T18:23:28","published_at_display":"14 Jul 2026, 18:23 GMT","sequence_badge_label":null,"sequence_count":null,"sequence_count_label":null,"sequence_frames":[],"sequence_kind":null,"source_name":"rfa_english_rss","source_name_label":"RFA English RSS","source_type":"rss","summary":"China\u2019s sanctions on a senior Philippine official \u2013 and statements that classify him as an apologist for Japan\u2019s wartime aggression \u2013 are attempts to drum up historical fears as Manila and Tokyo deepen security ties, analysts told Radio Free Asia. The sanctions on the Philippines\u2019 Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. came last month, when China\u2019s Foreign Ministry accused him of repeatedly making \u201cirresponsible remarks\u201d about China, damaging Chinese interests and undermining bilateral relations, all for comments critical of China\u2019s claims in the sea and aggressive activity there. Japan's Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi, left, and the Philippines' Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr., after their meeting in Manila, May 5, 2026. (Mark Cristino/AFP) The impact of the sanctions \u2013 which forbid Teodoro and his family from entering China and prevent any individuals or organizations from doing business with them \u2013 appears limited. Teodoro has indicated he has no intention of traveling to China, raising questions about what Beijing hopes to achieve. But the analysts say that Beijing\u2019s campaign against Teodoro attempts to use the memory of World War II to cast Japan as an aggressor in the Pacific in the modern day \u2013 in order to distract from the illegality of Beijing\u2019s claims over the entirety of the South China Sea. \u201cA purely South China Sea argument is difficult terrain for China,\u201d Aniello Iannone, a lecturer in Indonesian and Southeast Asian politics at Diponegoro University in Indonesia, told RFA. Iannone explained that Manila\u2019s claim to its own exclusive economic zone has legal bases under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS, a 2016 decision at the Permanent Court of Arbitration that said China\u2019s claim to the whole sea was invalid, and several other legal mechanisms. \u201cBringing Japan into the picture changes the terms of the dispute,\u201d he said. \u201cIt shifts attention away from Chinese conduct at sea and towards a broader political question: what kind of security order are Manila, Tokyo and Washington building in the region?\u201d The case against Teodoro Zhang Junshe of the People\u2019s Liberation Army Naval Military Academic Research Institute offered an unusually detailed case against Teodoro in comments to nationalist-leaning Chinese news and commentary site Guancha. Zhang accused Teodoro not only of \u201cmanipulating\u201d and \u201cinternationalizing\u201d the South China Sea dispute, but of hyping the \u201cChina threat\u201d while \u201cwhitewashing Japan\u2019s new militarism,\u201d referring to recent policy shifts in Tokyo that have led to increases in military spending, more active roles in cooperating with allies to counter regional threats, and significant debates over potential changes to pacifist clauses in Japan\u2019s constitution. Zhang juxtaposed these shifts against Japan\u2019s occupation of the Philippines during World War II, going as far as describing Teodoro\u2019s position as \u201crecognizing a thief as one\u2019s father.\u201d Members of the Living History Society, acting as Japanese soldiers, re-enact a scene of the \"Battle of the Pockets\" between allied and Japanese forces during World War II, at Camp Aguinaldo in Manila on March 25, 2017. (Ted Aljibe/AFP) The Philippines endured a brutal Japanese occupation between 1942 and 1945, a history Beijing regularly invokes in its criticism of Tokyo\u2019s expanding security role. Zhang said Japan was using the Philippines as a \u201cspringboard\u201d and \u201cstepping stone\u201d to loosen the constraints of the constitution, expand overseas military deployments and increase its regional military influence. History as a weapon Iannone said China\u2019s use of Japan\u2019s history in the Teodoro case should be understood as political rather than simply commemorative. \u201cBeijing is not just asking Filipinos to remember the Japanese occupation,\u201d he said. \u201cIt is using that history to question the legitimacy of Japan\u2019s return as a security actor in Southeast Asia.\u201d Iannone said that China is alarmed by the Philippines\u2019 willingness to work closely with Japan on security matters. \u201cThe underlying suggestion is that Japan\u2019s military normalization is not historically neutral, and that Manila is helping rehabilitate a former aggressor by deepening security cooperation with Tokyo.\u201d As part of their closer cooperation, Manila and Tokyo are not only agreeing to cooperate in strategic areas of the South China Sea, they are moving towards talks on the boundaries of their respective EEZs in waters where Taiwan has overlapping claims, Iannone said. The overlapping claims of China and the Philippines in the South China Sea. (AFP) China considers Taiwan as a rogue province, but an integral part of its own territory, so negotiations on boundaries between Japan and the Philippines in these waters without Chinese input would be seen as an affront to the legitimacy of Taiwan\u2019s \u2013 and therefore China\u2019s \u2013 claims. \u201cFrom Beijing\u2019s perspective, these are not isolated developments,\u201d Iannone said. \u201cThey can be read as parts of a strategic network linking the Philippines, Japan and the United States along China\u2019s maritime periphery.\u201d That creates a complication for Manila, which has sought to defend its South China Sea claims through international law while maintaining its one-China policy and avoiding open involvement in a cross-strait confrontation. \u201cChina has an interest in weakening that distinction,\u201d Iannone said. \u201cOnce Philippine cooperation with Japan is portrayed as part of a Taiwan-related security architecture, even ordinary maritime cooperation can be recast as participation in a wider containment strategy.\u201d A symbolic target The Philippine government has strongly backed Teodoro in light of the sanctions on him \u2013 the Department of Foreign Affairs called the sanctions an \u201cunfriendly act\u201d that would further complicate bilateral relations, while the Philippine military described them as political intimidation and said Teodoro\u2019s statements were grounded in international law. Teodoro said he would continue carrying out his duties and defending the Philippines against what he called China\u2019s \u201cwickedness,\u201d including at sea. China has not specified which of Teodoro\u2019s comments it considered irresponsible, Enrico Cau, a Taipei-based independent security researcher, told RFA. Teodoro\u2019s position, however, has received \u201cstrong backing by the Philippines\u2019 political and security establishment.\u201d The support suggests \u201cat least a substantial share of the country\u2019s political and security stakeholders, as well as a vast share of the population likely support such a position,\u201d he said. Philippines' Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr., speaks during a bilateral meeting with Japan's Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi in Manila, May 5, 2026. (Mark Cristino/AFP) Iannone described the sanctions as \u201cperformative coercion\u201d whose direct impact was limited but which sought to shape wider regional calculations. \u201cTeodoro is the immediate target, but the message is aimed at several audiences,\u201d he said. \u201cFor Teodoro and the Philippine political class, the message is that China is prepared to personalize diplomatic conflict and impose costs on officials who speak bluntly about Chinese coercion or advocate closer security cooperation with Japan and the United States.\u201d Punishing Teodoro is therefore not the objective, Iannone said. \u201cThe aim may not be to make Teodoro change his position,\u201d he said. \u201cIt may be to make others think twice before adopting the same tone.\u201d Cau noted that China overusing sanctions to try to silence its critics \u2013 especially in ways that have limited effect \u2013 carries a risk of undermining the threat of future sanctions. Iannone, meanwhile, said that the sanctions on Teodoro may in fact have the opposite of their intended effect. \u201cIn the Philippines, where distrust of China is already substantial, the sanction can reinforce his image as someone prepared to defend Philippine sovereignty,\u201d he said. Edited by Eugene Whong.","title":"China\u2019s sanctions on Philippine defense chief put Japan ties in spotlight","topic":"South China Sea","translation_language":"","url":"https://rfa.org/english/southchinasea/2026/07/14/philippines-teodoro-china-sanctions-japan/","video_url":null},{"article_body_paragraphs":[],"audio_source_url":null,"author":"Jason Gutierrez for RFA","available_dubs":[],"downloadable_assets":["https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/PNOXNYPNNRFRVIP6WGOLPSC7NY.JPG?auth=37501e58b1ebddecb48b9c4bbcd6c56c3710ed18efbe2fe390d468e29258fcd7&smart=true&width=1500"],"duration_display":"0:00","duration_seconds":null,"embed_url":null,"id":86,"image_caption":"A protest marking the 8th anniversary of the 2016 arbitration ruling over China's claims in the South China Sea, in Quezon City, Philippines, July 12, 2024. \"Atin ito!\" means \"This is ours!\" in Tagalog.","image_url":"https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/PNOXNYPNNRFRVIP6WGOLPSC7NY.JPG?auth=37501e58b1ebddecb48b9c4bbcd6c56c3710ed18efbe2fe390d468e29258fcd7&smart=true&width=1500","is_clip":false,"item_type":"article","item_type_label":"Article","language_label":"English","media_credit":"Jason Gutierrez for RFA","micro_label":"Photo","micro_label_kind":"gallery","network_label":"RFA","network_logo_url":"/static/uploads/direct_network_logos/rfa_ca00144ac549.png","published_at":"2026-07-11T14:57:56","published_at_display":"11 Jul 2026, 14:57 GMT","sequence_badge_label":null,"sequence_count":null,"sequence_count_label":null,"sequence_frames":[],"sequence_kind":null,"source_name":"rfa_english_rss","source_name_label":"RFA English RSS","source_type":"rss","summary":"Updated July 12, 2026 at 12:16 a.m. ET. MANILA, Philippines \u2013 As the Philippines marks the 10 th anniversary of an arbitration ruling it won against China in the disputed South China Sea this weekend, analysts told Radio Free Asia that Manila should counter Beijing\u2019s continued aggression in the disputed area through diplomatic means, while Philippine military officials called for deterrence with the help of allies. The 2016 ruling at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague established that China\u2019s Nine Dash Line \u2013 which encircles the South China Sea to claim it as Chinese territory \u2013 has no basis in international law. Manila celebrates the anniversary of the ruling on July 12 each year, calling it \u201cWest Philippine Sea Victory Day,\u201d after what it calls the region of the sea that lies within its exclusive economic zone, or EEZ. \u201cThe Department of National Defense joins the Filipino community in celebrating the 10th Anniversary of the 2016 Arbitral Award, a landmark ruling that affirmed the Philippines\u2019 rights and entitlements in its Exclusive Economic Zone,\u201d Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro said in a statement Saturday. The overlapping claims of China and the Philippines in the South China Sea. (AFP) China continues to reject the outcome of the ruling, and has spent the last 10 years stepping up its island-building activities in the mineral-rich sea region. It actively controls areas within the Philippines\u2019 EEZ including Scarborough Shoal. But it has no answer to the ruling, Rafaela David, co-convenor of the civilian-led Atin Ito Coalition, a group that advocates for Philippine sovereignty, told RFA. \u201cMissiles cannot substitute for legal arguments, and military intimidation cannot rewrite international law,\u201d she said, alluding to China\u2019s test of a submarine-launched ballistic missile earlier this week. \u201cNo act of coercion can erase this historic victory. We will continue to stand firm, defend the West Philippine Sea, and safeguard the rights and future of generations of Filipinos.\u201d Though the ongoing dispute has seen heated moments \u2013 such as China firing water cannons and pointing potentially blinding laser guns at Filipino forces \u2013 the Philippines should continue to employ peaceful methods to sway public opinion to its cause, Francis Rico Domingo, a political analyst at the state-run University of the Philippines, told RFA. \u201cThe Philippines needs to continue pushing back against China using diplomatic means,\u201d he said. \u201cThis involves filing diplomatic protests as often as possible and exposing China\u2019s illegal activities to the public and the United Nations.\u201d Expanded deterrence The court\u2019s ruling in 2016 cements the Philippines\u2019 legal foundation in the perennially disputed sea, Military chief General Romeo Brawner Jr. said Friday at a forum that gathered security experts in Manila, but he argued that more collaboration with \u201clike-minded forces\u201d led by the U.S. in deterrence efforts. To that end, he called for improvement in Manila\u2019s deterrence capabilities. He said that while advanced military equipment is needed there must be \u201cnational resolve to stand firm in defense of what is rightfully\u201d Philippine territory. Philippine military chief Gen. Romeo Brawner speaks at military headquarters in Manila, Oct. 3, 2025. (Ted Aljibe/AFP) \u201cOur objective has never been to provoke conflict,\u201d he told the forum. \u201cOur objective is to prevent conflict by making it clear that the Philippines has both the resolve and the capability to protect its sovereign rights in accordance with international law.\u201d Brawner said the security environment in the disputed area continues to evolve. \u201cWe continue to face illegal, coercive, aggressive and deceptive tactics,\u201d Brawner said, adding that these activities \u201cseek to alter the status quo while remaining below the threshold of armed conflict.\u201d A Su-30 fighter jet from China\u2019s Southern Theater Command is seen flying over Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea on Dec. 29, 2024. (Southern Theater Command) Brawner said that the Philippine military\u2019s \u201cassertive transparency\u201d strategy \u2013 thoroughly documenting Chinese aggressive actions and provocations and revealing them to the world \u2013 must continue. \u201cThrough our policy of assertive transparency, we document unlawful incidents, verify the facts and make them known to the Filipino people and to the international community,\u201d he said. \u201cWe do this not to escalate tensions. We do it because truth matters. Transparency strengthens accountability. It reinforces the rules based on international order and it denies those who employ coercive actions the ability to shape the narrative through deception.\u201d Shift in Focus Though the military may be equipped for deterrence in the disputed sea, the public might not be used to it in this role, Domingo said. Two years ago the Philippine military shifted from its role as an internal force meant to quell insurgencies and keep the peace domestically to the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept, or CADC, focused on defense from external threats and protecting territorial sovereignty. The concept \u201chas been frequently mentioned, but the public is not aware of what the strategy is and how it really works,\u201d Domingo said. Because China rejects the arbitration ruling, Manila must \u201cpermanently engage other countries to strengthen its capacity to defend itself from external aggression.\u201d But Domingo said that the Philippines also needed to engage Beijing diplomatically, and had to publicly acknowledge that every tension must be deescalated. For the CADC to be effective, the Philippines must review outdated military and defense concepts \u201cto add the importance of protecting our sovereign rights, territorial integrity and sovereignty,\u201d Teodoro said at the forum on Friday. A Dec. 4, 2024 photo shows a China Coast Guard ship, right, deploying a water cannon at the Philippine Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources vessel BRP Datu Pagbuaya near Scarborough Shoal in disputed waters of the South China Sea. (National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea via AFP) Teodoro said adjustments in the posture are under review because currently the Philippines\u2019 is still focused on \u201cland-based, post-invasion defense\u201d that was still a product of post-World War II strategy. He called for a bump on the country\u2019s defense budget, and noted that even Indonesia, which has a separate territorial dispute with China, looks to increase its defense spending to acquire new hardware. \u201cI would like to see a visible economic dividend from the West Philippine Sea that we all worked for, if unilaterally or in convergence with those who have truly helped us,\u201d he said. Popular support In Teodoro\u2019s Saturday statement, he noted that 86% of Filipinos were in support of Manila working with other countries to defend its territorial sovereignty. \u201cWe will seek not only to increase public knowledge of the West Philippine Sea, but also to ensure that this knowledge strengthens our national resolve and resilience,\u201d he said, vowing to \u201cresist and combat\u201d any attempts to deny the country its rights in its EEZ, \u201cFor these are not only ours to protect, but also those of future generations of Filipinos.\u201d The 10th anniversary of the landmark 2016 court ruling comes weeks after scholars affiliated with the Chinese government said at an academic symposium that the Philippines does not have legal sovereignty over the Batanes, a group of islands that lie north of the Philippines\u2019 largest island of Luzon which have been administered continuously by the Philippines or its predecessor states since the 18th century. The academics argued that the Batanes are \u201ca natural geographical extension of Taiwan,\u201d which China considers a renegade province. Edited by Eugene Whong. Update adds comments from Rafaela David.","title":"Philippines marks 10 years since historic South China Sea court ruling","topic":"South China Sea","translation_language":"","url":"https://rfa.org/english/southchinasea/2026/07/11/philippines-china-disputed-sea-west/","video_url":null},{"article_body_paragraphs":[],"audio_source_url":null,"author":"Taejun Kang for RFA","available_dubs":[],"downloadable_assets":["https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/OT5LRZPS3ZEIPE2SO6BLGL2IVA.jpg?auth=9e7de5bfb3e9f227f464e76d36d64e0e09d4dbafdb90ce5c6d48f38fb744160d&smart=true&width=1500"],"duration_display":"0:00","duration_seconds":null,"embed_url":null,"id":91,"image_caption":"Two Philippine Air Force FA-50s, left, flying alongside two U.S. Air Force F-15C Eagles over the South China Sea during joint maritime and air patrols, Nov. 21, 2023.","image_url":"https://www.rfa.org/resizer/v2/OT5LRZPS3ZEIPE2SO6BLGL2IVA.jpg?auth=9e7de5bfb3e9f227f464e76d36d64e0e09d4dbafdb90ce5c6d48f38fb744160d&smart=true&width=1500","is_clip":false,"item_type":"article","item_type_label":"Article","language_label":"English","media_credit":"Taejun Kang for RFA","micro_label":"Photo","micro_label_kind":"gallery","network_label":"RFA","network_logo_url":"/static/uploads/direct_network_logos/rfa_ca00144ac549.png","published_at":"2026-07-03T02:00:28","published_at_display":"3 Jul 2026, 02:00 GMT","sequence_badge_label":null,"sequence_count":null,"sequence_count_label":null,"sequence_frames":[],"sequence_kind":null,"source_name":"rfa_english_rss","source_name_label":"RFA English RSS","source_type":"rss","summary":"China remains focused on the United States as its chief geopolitical rival, even though a recent Chinese report on military activity in the South China Sea highlighted the growing role of Washington\u2019s allies in the region, experts told Radio Free Asia. The report, published by the China-based South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative, or SCSPI, found that U.S. military activity in the South China Sea remained extensive in 2025, despite signs of operational strain due to Washington\u2019s increased activity in the Middle East. Although the SCSPI is not government-led, it is widely viewed by analysts as broadly reflecting Beijing\u2019s strategic outlook, and the report indicated increased Japanese and Philippine deployment to the South China Sea. \u201cChina increasingly views Japan and the Philippines\u2019 efforts to deepen defense cooperation \u2026 as attempts by both countries to challenge China\u2019s core interests and cross a red line,\u201d William Yang, a Northeast Asia analyst at the Belgium-based International Crisis Group, told RFA. Japan participated in 71 U.S.-led exercises in and around the South China Sea last year \u2013 the highest number among U.S. partners \u2013 followed by the Philippines with 32, and Yang said the focus on Tokyo and Manila shows that Beijing considers Washington\u2019s allies more formidable than in the past. A member of the Philippine Navy looks out at the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force's destroyer Takanami during a joint maritime exercise in the South China Sea on June 14, 2025. (Jiji Press/AFP) \u201cThey see both countries\u2019 assertive approach toward maritime disputes with China as a threat to its maritime interests and sovereignty claims and believe it is necessary to start increasing pressure on both countries,\u201d Yang said. He added that Chinese officials have been \u201cincreasingly criticizing Japan and the Philippines for provoking regional instability by engaging on the Taiwan issue\u201d and \u201chave taken steps to increase economic and grey zone coercion against both countries in recent months.\u201d Washington distracted? Despite the increased attention to Washington\u2019s allies in the report, Beijing\u2019s largest concern is still U.S. activities in the sea, Yang said. \u201cHowever, in light of the U.S.-China detente under Trump and Washington\u2019s continuous entanglement in the Middle East, Beijing thinks it needs to seize this window of opportunity to increase pressure on particular U.S. allies in the region amid Washington\u2019s distraction,\u201d he said. The SCSPI report concluded that indeed growth in some U.S. strategic platforms had slowed \u2013 It recorded nine U.S. carrier strike group deployments into the South China Sea in 2025, up slightly from eight the previous year, but said the overall intensity of carrier operations had declined because of extended deployments in the Middle East, maintenance demands, and operational accidents involving several carriers. Philippine marines take position next to U.S. amphibious assault vehicles during an amphibious landing exercise at the beach of the Philippine navy training center facing the South China Sea in San Antonio, Zambales province, Philippines on Oct. 6, 2018. (Ted Aljibe/AFP) Analysts say the more significant issue for China is not the number of U.S. carriers entering the South China Sea, but how allied networks are making American military presence more persistent. \u201cThe report focuses on Japan and the Philippines because they are two of the most important allied pressure points on China\u2019s maritime perimeter, but they create different military problems for Beijing,\u201d Sylwia M. Gorska, a Ph.D candidate in international relations at the University of Lancashire in the United Kingdom, told RFA. Multilateral containment? She said that the Philippines represents China\u2019s \u201cforward-access problem, pointing to its proximity to the disputed Scarborough Shoal and Spratly Islands, the Luzon Strait, the Bashi Channel and Taiwan\u2019s southern approaches. \u201cFrom Beijing\u2019s perspective, the Philippines is no longer only a South China Sea claimant,\u201d she said, \u201cIt is becoming a practical access and surveillance platform.\u201d She said Manila\u2019s increased surveillance capabilities would be useful for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance flights, or ISR; maritime-domain awareness; joint patrols, logistics; missile-capable deployments; and crisis response along the southern First Island Chain, the arc of islands running from Japan through Taiwan and the Philippines to Borneo, forming a key maritime boundary around China\u2019s near seas. A map of the first and second Pacific island chains. (AFP) Japan, meanwhile, presents \u201cthe depth-and-integration problem,\u201d she said. \u201cIt does not need to be a South China Sea claimant to affect the military balance there,\u201d said Gorska, adding that Tokyo\u2019s surveillance capabilities, anti-submarine warfare, logistics, missile defense and interoperability with U.S. forces link the South China Sea with Taiwan, the East China Sea and the wider western Pacific. But Gorska cautioned against interpreting the report as evidence that Beijing now sees Japan and the Philippines as greater threats than the United States, saying it \u201cshould not be read as a move from a U.S.-centric threat perception to an ally-centric one.\u201d American \u201cbackbone\u201d Any resistance to China\u2019s projections of power in the region would still be led by Washington, Gorska said, adding that the U.S. would provide \u201cthe operational backbone of any serious regional contingency: command-and-control, ISR, undersea warfare, long-range strike, strategic mobility and extended deterrence.\u201d Gorska said that China\u2019s sharper focus reflects concerns that allied cooperation is turning periodic U.S. deployments into a more enduring military posture. \u201cThe issue is not a shift from \u2018U.S. threat\u2019 to \u2018ally threat\u2019. It is China\u2019s sharper focus on how allied geography and interoperability compress the time available to localize a crisis before U.S.-aligned forces can sense, reinforce and act.\u201d Yang said that Beijing\u2019s long-term strategic assessment remains largely unchanged. \u201cI don\u2019t think there is a major strategic shift in Beijing,\u201d he said. \u201cTheir threat assessment remains largely the same, which is to prevent U.S. containment of China\u2019s capability to project its power across the region and into the Pacific.\u201d But the report indicates that Beijing cannot ignore Washington\u2019s allies and the opportunities presented by U.S. military activity in the Middle East. China \u201cdoes see the need and an opening to sharpen its approach and increase pressure on Japan and the Philippines at a time when U.S. attention and resource allocation to Asia is undermined and distorted.\u201d Edited by Eugene Whong.","title":"U.S. still China\u2019s main rival despite report on Japan and Philippines\u2019 capabilities","topic":"South China Sea","translation_language":"","url":"https://rfa.org/english/southchinasea/2026/07/03/china-japan-philippines-south-china-sea/","video_url":null}],"next_num":null,"page":1,"pages":1,"per_page":20,"prev_num":null,"total":9}